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This dissertation proposes new methods to improve the efficiency of
electricity markets with respect to market monitoring and reserve allocation.
We first present new approaches to monitor the level of competition in elec-
tricity markets, a critical task for helping the markets function smoothly. The
proposed approaches are based on economic principles and a faithful represen-
tation of transmission constraints. The effectiveness of the new approaches is
demonstrated by examples based on medium- and large-scale electric power
systems. We then propose a new system-operation model using stochastic op-
timization to systematically allocate reserves under uncertainty. This model
aims to overcome the difficulties in both system and market operations caused
by the integration of wind power, which results in a higher degree of sup-
ply uncertainty. The numerical examples suggest that the proposed model
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In the past two decades, the electric power industry has been restruc-
tured around the world and more than a dozen electricity markets were created
in various countries. However, there are still many problems threatening the
efficiency of electricity markets. This dissertation aims to tackle two specific
problems in electricity markets: market monitoring and reserve allocation.
Assessing the competitiveness in electricity markets is a key procedure that
helps these markets function smoothly. However, most current approaches
adopted by transmission-constrained markets have only weak connections to
economic principles and thus the results may be misleading. To provide more
meaningful results, we propose new approaches that are based on both eco-
nomic principles and faithful representations of Kirchhoff’s laws. Numerical
studies demonstrate that the proposed approaches indeed offer useful insights
about market monitors. We then propose a new model for allocating reserve
to improve both the efficiency of market operations and system reliability.
Careful allocation of reserves is especially important under high levels of wind
power penetration, due to the increased degree of supply uncertainty. The pro-
posed model uses stochastic optimization to systematically allocate reserves
by incorporating variability of wind, deliverability of reserves, and adequacy of
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primary frequency control. Numerical results show that the proposed model
can indeed improve the efficiency of system operations in terms of operation
costs, compared to the current approach adopted by most electricity markets.
This chapter continues with a brief overview of restructured electricity
markets. It then discusses two specific challenges addressed in this dissertation:
market monitoring (Section 1.2) and reserve allocation (Section 1.3). The
final section of the chapter summarizes contributions of this dissertation and
provides an outline of the following chapters.
1.1 Overview of restructured electricity markets
Historically, electricity has been provided by regulated utilities that are
vertically integrated. These utilities provide all required services for delivering
electricity, namely, generation, transmission, and distribution. With advances
in transmission technology, which enable electricity to be transported a thou-
sand miles with less than 3% loss, the generation sector is being pulled out of
the formerly integrated, three-segment industry, and no longer has the prop-
erty of a natural monopoly [64]. By 1990, several regions in various countries
began to deregulate the generation sector and formed wholesale electricity
markets. The resulting introduction of competition is expected to make the
industry more efficient and technologically innovative, thereby, reducing both
costs for producing electricity and prices that consumers pay for electricity.
Electricity markets differ from other commodity markets in many as-
pects. For example, because of the lack of economical, large-scale energy
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storage, supply and demand should balance at all times. Furthermore, the
electricity market is tightly coupled with the underlying electric power grid,
a large and complex engineering system. For example, the transactions of
power in electricity markets must not cause any overloaded transmission line
that might endanger power system reliability. Therefore, a system operator
is necessary to both administer a centralized market and control the power
system. In the United States, non-profit system operators are also known as
independent system operators (ISOs). There are currently seven ISOs in the
U.S.: California ISO (CAISO), Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT),
Midwest ISO (MISO), ISO New England (ISO-NE), New York ISO (NYISO),
PJM Interconnection, and Southwest Power Pool (SPP).
An ISO typically operates two centralized markets: a real-time and a
day-ahead market. In a real-time market, transactions of power correspond to
actual power flow in the system. The ISO clears the real-time market, that is,
determines which offers for production to accept, by solving an optimal power
flow model. In this case that model is referred to as “offer-based economic
dispatch” or “economic dispatch.” A generator’s offer expresses the willingness-
to-sell at various production quantities. According to microeconomic theory,
under perfect competition, the offer would simply be the marginal cost for a
generator. Economic dispatch produces price and dispatch, i.e., the amount
of power that a ISO asks a generator to produce, for each generator while
matching supply and demand with minimum total generation costs; limits on
transmission line flows are imposed as constraints in economic dispatch to
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ensure that no lines are overloaded.
Economic dispatch, formulated as an optimization problem, is solved
by state-of-the-art optimization software [21, §4.5]. The system operator clears
real-time markets every 5-15 minutes as load conditions vary. Note that eco-
nomic dispatch not only produces market-clearing prices that match supply
and demand, but also provides dispatch decisions for system operations. In
other words, economic dispatch has the dual nature of market operations and
power system operations.
The most prevalent electric power market design in North America is a
locational marginal price (LMP) market, also known as a nodal pricing mar-
ket. In an LMP market, the price at each location in the network reflects
the marginal cost of consuming additional power at that location. An LMP
market is considered the most efficient market design for managing real-time
transmission congestion [64]. Also, locational prices serve as signals to incen-
tivize generation investments at the locations where new resources are needed.
This mechanism helps to keep the system efficient in the long run.
However, in an LMP market, generators which are indispensable for
resolving congestion may possess market power, defined as the ability to prof-
itably shift market prices from competitive levels. Market power can cause
inefficient market operations or, in the worst cast, a market break-down, such
as the electricity crisis in California in 2000 [33]. Therefore, reliable analy-
ses on market power are necessary to ensure efficient market operations. The
need for such analyses motivates us to develop new approaches that help mar-
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ket monitors analyze market power, where market monitors are regulatory
agencies that detect market power and take necessary actions to restore the
competitiveness of the markets. We will introduce the issue of market power
more thoroughly in Section 1.2, and present the new approaches for analyzing
market power in Chapter 2 and 3.
Besides operations of a centralized market, the ISO is also responsible
for balancing demand and supply at all times, a key issue for keeping its system
stable and reliable. This task of matching demand and supply is becoming
more challenging because of the increasing supply uncertainty caused by wind
power generation. The need for a systematic method that helps the ISO make
operational decisions under uncertainty motivates our development of a new
system-operation model in Chapter 4.
In an electric power system, generators are synchronized to a single
frequency, which is 60Hz in the U.S. The system operator is responsible for
maintaining the system frequency within a small range to ensure system sta-
bility. This task requires a balance between generation and load at all times.
To cope with load forecast errors or unanticipated loss of system components
such as generators and transmission lines, the system operator needs operat-
ing reserves, that is, spare generation capacity. Operating reserves are parts
of the ancillary services offered by generation providers. In some markets,
such as ERCOT [21], load can also provide reserves in that certain customers
can agree to reduce their power consumption, if necessary. Typical types of
operating reserves are:
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• Generation regulation, services provided by operating generators to
deal with small load fluctuation. These generators adjust power output
according to control signals sent from the system operator every few
seconds.
• Spinning reserves, spare capacities provided by operating generators
for unexpected loss of generators. These generators respond immediately
(within several seconds) to the decline of the system frequency.
• Non-spinning reserves, spare capacities provided by off-line (unsyn-
chronized) generators for replacing failed units and restoring the system
to a normal state. The typical response time of non-spinning reserves is
10-30 minutes.
Operating reserves can be viewed as commodities different from energy
and thus could be traded in a separate market. However, operating reserves
are tightly coupled with energy, because a unit of generation capacity can pro-
vide either energy or reserve, but not both. This linkage would make separate
markets inefficient, so a market should trade energy and reserves simultane-
ously. Under this framework, supply and demand of reserves are represented in
the economic dispatch problem so that energy and reserves are co-optimized.
In this formulation, the opportunity costs of selling energy or reserves are ex-
plicitly represented. Today, some ISOs operate co-optimized markets in both
day-ahead and real-time markets, (e.g., MISO [40], CAISO [16], and NY-
ISO [42]), while other ISOs, such as ERCOT [21], only operate co-optimized
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markets in day-ahead markets.
System reliability has the property of externality, that is, every market
participant will benefit from the increased system reliability that results from
an additional unit of reserve provided by a market participant. Therefore, the
demand for reserves must be regulated. ISOs are responsible for determining
the appropriate allocation of reserves based on engineering analysis. Improper
allocation of reserves may degrade both the efficiency in market operations
and system reliability. For example, excessive reserves may result in unnec-
essary costs for system operations. On the other hand, insufficient reserves
may endanger the system reliability and cause interruption of service for some
consumers. The reserve allocation issue becomes more significant and challeng-
ing with increasing penetration levels of wind power, which causes a higher
degree of supply uncertainty. The need for a systematic method to allocate re-
serve under uncertainty motivates our development of a new system-operation
model. We will introduce the issues regarding reserves more comprehensively
in Section 1.3, and present the new system-operation model in Chapter 4.
1.2 Challenges in market monitoring
Electricity markets need to be closely monitored by regulatory agen-
cies to ensure enough competition, an essential element for well-functioning
markets. Market power, defined as the ability to profitably shift market prices
away from competitive prices [64, Section 4-1.1], can seriously weaken the lev-
els of competition in electricity markets. Reduced levels of competition may
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result in problems such as undesirable transfer of wealth from consumers to
suppliers, or even lead to a market breakdown. Electricity markets typically
are monitored using a variety of market power indices, which measure the
competitiveness of the markets. However, many markets have adopted ad hoc
indices that only have tenuous connections to economic incentives of exercising
market power; because the foundation is ad hoc, the results can be misleading
sometimes [64, Chapter 4-5]. This is particularly the case for the indices that
consider the effects of transmission constraints, as will be explained below.
Also, to better understand the strategic behavior of market participants, mar-
ket monitors usually need a variety of methods that provide different insights
about market power. This dissertation develops different indices to assess
market power in transmission-constrained electricity markets. Unlike ad hoc
methods, the proposed indices are based on economic principles with faithful
representations of the effects of Kirchhoff’s laws.
The existence of market power results primarily from “market concen-
tration” in the generation sector. In other words, the wholesale electricity
market is typically an oligopoly, that is, this market is dominated by a limited
number of large suppliers. Under this market structure, perfect competition is
less likely and large suppliers usually possess some ability to control prices. In
addition, the low level of price-responsive demand (i.e., only a few consumers
adjust their power consumption in response to changing prices) further con-
tributes to the market power of market participants. Market power can be
exercised through either “physical” or “financial” withholding: physical with-
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holding is achieved by reducing generation output, while financial withholding
is achieved by raising offer prices.
The exercise of market power causes an undesirable transfer of wealth
from consumers to suppliers. In the worst scenario, the excessive transfer
of wealth can lead to a market breakdown, such as the electricity crisis of
2000 in California [33]. In addition, market power may lead to inefficient dis-
patch, which reduces total social welfare. For example, an ISO may be forced
to dispatch more expensive generators when cheaper generators physically or
financially withhold. To prevent the abuse of market power that leads to inef-
ficient market operations, market power mitigation rules imposed by market
monitors are necessary in an electricity market.
Market power mitigation rules should be aimed at maintaining or restor-
ing prices to competitive levels. However, it is usually difficult to justify the
appropriate levels of prices, particularly in “energy-only” markets such as ER-
COT. In energy-only markets, since there is no installed capacity payment
mechanism as in the restructured markets of the U.S. Northeast [51], compet-
itive energy prices must occasionally rise above the highest typical marginal
costs in the system. The occasional high prices help generation asset owners
recover their investments, so that there would be enough generation capac-
ity for growing demand. When prices are high, it is difficult to determine
if these prices result from scarcity, i.e., insufficient system capacity to meet
demand, or market manipulation, i.e., the exercise of market power. Failure
to identify the competitive prices, i.e., the resulting prices when no market
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power is exercised, may lead to inappropriate market power mitigation. On
the one hand, “under-mitigation,” allowing market prices to rise excessively
above competitive prices, would create an unacceptable transfer of wealth and
cause sub-optimal dispatch, as discussed in the previous paragraph. On the
other hand, “over-mitigation,” driving prices below competitive levels, will
result in inadequate investment in generation in an energy-only market.
Appropriate market power mitigation rules should be based on market
power analyses strongly connected to the fundamental economic incentives of
exercising market power. Electricity markets adopted various indices as tools
for quantifying market power. However, most market power indices that con-
sider the effects of transmission constraints are only weakly connected to the
economic incentives. For example, in the context of the ERCOT nodal market
there is an annual competitiveness test for assessing the potential of geograph-
ical market power associated with transmission constraints [21, §3.19.1]. This
test omits the economic incentives of market participants in a transmission-
constrained market and thus may lead to unreliable results. On the other
hand, although some indices, such as the Lerner index [64, §4-3.4] and resid-
ual supply index [59], model economic incentives, they do not incorporate the
effects of transmission constraints. Such indices might also produce mislead-
ing results in LMP markets. In this dissertation, different indices are proposed
to assess market power in transmission-constrained electricity markets. Un-
like ad hoc methods, the proposed indices are built on fundamental economic
principles and a more faithful representation of transmission constraints. The
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numerical examples suggest that the proposed indices indeed provide useful
insights about market power.
Chapter 2 describes new indices based on “small-signal” analysis, uti-
lizing the sensitivities of prices with respect to power production quantities,
under the assumption that each market participant owns all its generation as-
sets at the same location. We relax this assumption in Chapter 3 and propose
new market power indices using both “small-signal” and “large-signal” analy-
ses: in the “large-signal” analysis, we quantify the possession of market power
assuming that a generation firm withdraws all its supply from the system.
1.3 Challenges in reserve allocation
Maintaining power system reliability has been a challenging task due
to the possible failure of system components and the uncertainty in demand.
In restructured electricity markets, system reliability is maintained by procur-
ing operating reserves from generation providers, with reserve requirements
typically set to ensure that, for example, loss of the largest operating gener-
ator does not cause any involuntary load shedding. However, such a simple
strategy for allocating reserves fails to reflect several important issues regard-
ing reserves, such as variability of wind power, deliverability of reserves and
adequacy levels of frequency control. Ignoring these issues may lead to im-
proper allocation of reserves, which may result in unnecessary operation costs
or expose the system to higher risks of interrupting electricity services. This
dissertation proposes a frequency-constrained, stochastic, economic dispatch
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model for allocating reserves to improve the efficiency of system operations.
Unlike existing models in the literature, the proposed model addresses the key
issues regarding reserves in a more comprehensive and systematic manner.
Large-scale integration of wind power poses significant challenges to
both system and market operation, due to its intermittent and variable na-
ture. Wind power is typically much more unpredictable than load, and thus
significant errors in wind power forecasting are common in daily grid opera-
tion. Figure 1.1, showing the hourly-average wind power profile in the ERCOT
system on April 10 of 2011, provides an example of the limitations of wind
power forecasts. The solid curve (“Actual wind”) represents the actual wind
power output, while the dashed (“DA wind forecast”) and dash-dotted (“HA
wind forecast”) lines describe the day-ahead and hour-ahead forecasted wind
power, respectively. The largest forecasting errors are around 4500MW in
day-ahead forecast and 3300MW in hour-ahead forecast. In the case of an
unexpected drop in wind power production, the system operator may need to
deploy operating reserves to balance generation and load.
With large-scale integration of wind power, the appropriate reserve
requirements are no longer obvious. According to a GE report [23], with 15GW
installed wind power capacity in the ERCOT system, the size of the largest
wind power ramp-down within 30 minutes would exceed 2.8GW, greater than
the largest generation loss possible in the current ERCOT system (2.44GW).
Also, the report suggests that the co-occurrence of both generation outages and
unanticipated change in wind should be considered in the reserve allocation
12
Figure 1.1: Actual and forecasted wind power in the ERCOT system. This figure
indicates the limitations of wind power forecasts, exhibiting errors roughly 4500MW
and 3300MW in day-ahead hour-ahead forecast, respectively. These errors are sig-
nificantly greater than the capacity of the largest nuclear power plant in the ERCOT
(2443MW).
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process. As a result, as wind power penetration increases, the simple criterion
of obtaining reserves to deal with the largest generation loss may no longer
suffice.
Another problematic issue regarding reserves is their geographical allo-
cation. Reserve requirements are usually system-wide constraints. As a result,
such requirements ignore possible transmission congestion when reserves are
deployed in response to contingencies. Although some systems, such as ISO-
NE [31], NYISO [42], and MISO [40], use zonal reserve requirements to address
this issue. However, this method may not be sufficiently accurate due to lack
of representation of the meshed structure of typical transmission systems. In
addition, zonal reserve requirements, usually determined in off-line studies, do
not have the flexibility of being adjusted according to actual line flows in the
real-time.
In addition to post-contingency transmission constraints, another im-
portant issue in reserve allocation is the sufficiency of primary frequency con-
trol, the autonomous response by generation resources to the deviation of
frequency from nominal. In electric power systems, most generators are syn-
chronized, that is, they rotate at the same frequency. This frequency will
change when generation and load are not balanced: when generation output is
greater (less) than load, generators speed up (slow down) causing the system
frequency to increase (decrease). To maintain system reliability, it is crucial
to keep the system frequency within a small range. This task is particularly
challenging when the system suffers from a large disturbance, for example, an
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unexpected outage of a base-load generator. A large disturbance could cause a
rapid decline in system frequency, which may result in involuntary load shed-
ding, i.e., interruption of electricity services for some customers. To deal with
significant excursions in the system frequency, the system operator needs suf-
ficient primary frequency control by having reserves allocated properly across
each generating unit.
Typically, the issue of frequency control is more significant in small,
isolated power systems, such as the systems in Ireland and New Zealand,
because of their small system inertia [66] [67]. In such systems, the levels of
inertia and reserve requirements are set to ensure that the frequency deviations
are limited after the loss of the largest unit [20] [66]. With increasing levels of
wind power penetration, frequency excursions might also be problematic even
in large-scale isolated systems such as ERCOT, since wind resources provide
only limited inertia and frequency control. Reference [36] also reports that the
quality of frequency control in the U.S. has been declining in recent years and
suggests that careful planning of primary frequency control is necessary.
To summarize, the main issues regarding reserve allocation include
• variability of wind power generation,
• geographical allocation of reserves, and
• sufficient primary frequency control.
Existing models [11,35,49,58] for allocating reserves mostly focus on the first
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two issues above and thus omit the impact of frequency control on system
operation. This dissertation proposes a new economic dispatch model that
systematically addresses the above issues simultaneously. This model deter-
mines an optimal energy dispatch and reserve allocation so that the costs and
benefits of reliability are balanced. A more comprehensive literature surveys
and the development of the model will be reported in Chapter 4.
1.4 Dissertation overview
This dissertation develops new methods to improve efficiency of electric-
ity markets with respect to market monitoring and reserve allocation. These
methods include
• new approaches, based on economic principles and Kirchhoffs’ law, to
analyze market power in transmission-constrained electricity markets ,
and
• a new economic dispatch model to dispatch generation and allocate re-
serves under uncertainty, in order to deal with the supply uncertainty
caused, in part, by growing penetration of wind power.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes new
market power indices using a “small-signal” analysis, which is based on sensi-
tivities of prices with respect to production quantities, under the assumption
that each market participant owns all its generation assets at the same location.
We relax this assumption in Chapter 3 and propose new market power indices
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using both “small-signal” and “large-signal” analyses: in the “large-signal”
analysis, we quantify the possession of market power assuming a generation
firm withdraws all its supply from the system. Chapter 4 describes the new
economic dispatch model using stochastic optimization. Chapter 5 concludes
this dissertation and discusses possible directions of future research.
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Chapter 2
Generator-Based Market Power Indices
Electricity markets adopt various indices to assess the level of compe-
tition in electricity markets. Typically, these indices quantify market power,
defined as a market participant’s ability to profitably change prices from com-
petitive levels. Market monitors, regulatory agencies that take necessary ac-
tions to maintain the competitiveness of the markets, use these indices as
screening tools to identify participants that are more likely exercising their
market power. However, none of these indices represent both economic incen-
tives and the impacts of transmission constraints in principled manners. As a
result, these indices may lead to inappropriate market-power mitigation that
threats the efficiency of electricity markets. To overcome the shortcomings of
existing indices, we introduce four new indices of market power in transmission-
constrained electricity markets that are based on economic principles and a
more faithful representation of the effects of Kirchhoff’s laws. The indices are
developed using a “small-signal” analysis based on sensitivities of prices with
respect to production quantities. We assume that each market participant
owns one or more generators at the same location. This assumption will be
relaxed in Chapter 3 to deal with typical case in locational marginal pricing
(LMP) markets, that is, assets are usually owned at different locations.
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 surveys current ap-
proaches to analyzing market power. Then, Section 2.2 develops the indices.
Section 2.3 discusses implementation of the indices. Section 2.4 presents case
studies to illustrate the indices and Section 2.5 concludes.
2.1 Current Approaches to Analyzing Market Power
Current market power assessment approaches and screening tools fall
into two broad categories:
1. principles-based approaches that explicitly examine incentives to deviate
from competitive prices, and
2. ad hoc approaches based on indices such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI).
As an example of the first category, [64] and [70] use the derivative of the
residual demand faced by a generator to assess the incentives of a hypothetical
profit-maximizing firm to mark-up prices above marginal costs; however, the
analysis does not explicitly treat transmission constraints. An example of this
kind of assessment is outlined in section 2.1.1 in order to provide background
and basis for extension to the case of transmission constraints.
As another example of the first category, [10] considers two zones joined
by a single radial transmission line in a Cournot framework. While a two zone
model is appropriate for some particular cases, such as modeling of California
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represented as two zones (i.e., north and south), LMP markets have more com-
plicated interactions due to the meshed nature of transmission. To summarize,
the approaches for assessing market power that are rooted in economic analy-
sis have not been extended to consider the implications of Kirchhoff’s laws in
a realistic meshed network. The limitations of a model of transmission that is
limited to a single radial transmission line will be explored in Section 2.1.2.
Another type of principled analysis involves modeling the generation
firm’s behavior as a two level optimization problem [26]: the top level is the
firm’s profit-maximization problem and the bottom level is an optimal power
flow (OPF) program that determines the market outcome, including the LMPs,
given the action of the firm. While this is a principled method of modeling the
strategic behavior of a firm, this two-level optimization problem is non-convex
and difficult to solve, especially for large-scale systems.
As the last example of the first category, [59] and [60] discuss an index,
the “residual supply index” (RSI), that reflects the degree to which a firm’s
offer is necessary to meet demand. At high levels of demand, physical with-
holding in capacity would lead to infeasibility. In this case, the generator is
sometimes said to be “pivotal” [59] [60] [24] [44]. If a generator is pivotal then,
in principle, it can increase the price arbitrarily. In addition, reference [44] also
shows the link between the RSI and market power.
The second category, the ad hoc approaches, includes application to
transmission-constrained markets with meshed networks. However, because
the foundation is ad hoc, the results can be unreliable or even misleading.
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(See, for example, the discussion in [64, Chapter 4-5].) An example of such an
ad hoc screening tool, based on the ERCOT nodal market design, is outlined
and evaluated critically in Section 2.1.3.
2.1.1 Principles-based analysis of market power in the absence of
transmission constraints
As discussed above, [64] [70] describe an approach to assessing the in-
centives for a generator to mark-up its offer price above marginal costs in the
absence of transmission constraints. The basic analysis considers the residual
demand, that is, actual demand minus the supply of all the other participants
in the market, and asks how a hypothetical profit-maximizing market partic-
ipant would have offered in response to this residual demand. If that offer
would involve significant mark-up of price above marginal cost and the gen-
erator is not operating at its maximum capacity, then the market participant
has market power. Such a finding could be used in a subsequent market-power
mitigation process.
To understand the residual demand, suppose that the demand in a
particular pricing interval is D. (We ignore price-responsiveness of demand
here, but it can be incorporated into the analysis.) Furthermore, consider a
particular market participant k and suppose that the total offered generation
of all the other market participants besides k is specified by the function
q−k : R → R. In particular, at the price P , the total offered generation of
all the other market participants is q−k(P ). (We will follow the “economics”
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convention of using the symbol P for price and the symbol q for quantity
produced, in this case quantity of electricity.) The residual demand faced
by market participant k is simply D − q−k(P ). The inverse of the function
(D − q−k) is the inverse residual demand function faced by participant k,
p−k : R→ R.
Following, for example, [64] [70], to analyze the incentives faced by
market participant k, we consider the conditions for market participant k to
maximize its profit. In this context, profit, πk : R→ R, is defined as operating
profit, meaning revenue minus costs, given a generation quantity. Ignoring
forward contracts, revenue equals the product of:
• quantity, qk, of electricity produced by the generator, multiplied by
• the resulting price p−k(qk),
noting that the definition of inverse residual demand is the resulting market
clearing price in the market given that the generator produces the quantity
qk. We assume that the production cost function of participant k is specified
by the function ck : R→ R. Summarizing, profit for market participant k is:
∀qk ∈ R, πk(qk) = qkp−k(qk)− ck(qk).
Assuming that sufficient conditions for maximization are satisfied, that p−k
and ck are differentiable, and that generation capacity constraints are not
binding at the profit-maximizing condition, we can find the maximum of profit
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is the marginal cost. Re-arranging, we obtain the price-cost
mark-up of price above marginal cost under the above assumptions and the
hypothesis that the generator is maximizing its profits:




(Since the market-clearing price is non-increasing in increasing generation by
market participant k, we have that
∂p−k
∂qk
(qk) ≤ 0 and the right-hand side
of (2.1) is non-negative.) As a basic measure of market power, if the right-
hand side of (2.1) is “large” then a profit-maximizing generator has incentives
to drive up prices by withholding (at least in the absence of a forward contract,
to be discussed below).
The estimate of mark-up (2.1) provides one basic index of market power
that could be utilized by a market monitor. For example, a threshold could
be established of, say, 10% above marginal cost or $20/MWh above marginal
cost. Any generator that is not at full production but such that the right-hand
side of (2.1) is above the threshold would be flagged by market monitors as of
concern of exercising market power. Such generators might then be subject to
market-power mitigation such as limits on offer prices.
Equation (2.1) is sometimes re-arranged to obtain an expression for
the Lerner index, an index defined as the relative price-cost mark-up with
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respect to price, that is, (p−k(qk) − c′k(qk))/p−k(qk) [64, §4-3.4]. However, as
argued in [64, §4-5.2], mark-up above competitive prices (and mark-up above
marginal costs) is likely to be more meaningful than the Lerner index for
measuring market power. In any case, the subsequent analysis in this chapter
is most easily written in terms of the price mark-up, so the rest of the analysis
will focus on mark-up rather than Lerner index.
To the extent that marginal costs roughly represent the level of compet-
itive prices, the estimated mark-up approximates the excess transfer of wealth,
over and above competitive levels, from consumers to producers, per MW of
production [64, §4.1]. Multiplying by production qk, the following can be used





However, this index of excess wealth transfer should be used with caution since
the marginal cost c′k(qk) of participant k at its production level may be below
the competitive price [64] and, consequently, the actual excess wealth transfer
may be less than implied by (2.2).
So far the analysis has not considered the impacts of forward contracts,
agreements between market participants to purchase or sell electricity at an
agreed price and quantity on a specified time in the future. Forward contracts
change the competitive situation somewhat [64, §4-4.3]. In the case that the
generator has a forward contract for quantity qfk at price p
f
k then the profit
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function becomes:
∀qk, πfk(qk) = (qk − qfk)p−k(qk) + qfkpfk − ck(qk).
Again assuming that sufficient conditions for maximization are satisfied, that
p−k and ck are differentiable, and that generation capacity constraints are not
binding at the profit-maximizing condition, we can find the maximum profit









Again re-arranging, we obtain the price-cost mark-up with a forward contract
under the hypothesis that the generator was maximizing its profits:









To the extent that a significant fraction of the production is forward con-
tracted, these expressions show that the short-term incentives for mark-up are
reduced [64, §4-4.3]. (However, in general, a more complicated analysis in-
volving the interaction between incentives in the forward and “spot” markets
is necessary to fully elucidate incentives [1] [43] [4] [13]. Although forward
contracts do contribute to reducing incentives for exercising market power,
the results are not completely understood in the context of supply offers in
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an electricity market, however, and we will ignore this interaction in the dis-
cussion below by simply assuming that the expression on the right-hand side
of (2.3) is appropriate as an index for assessing market power.)
Paralleling the previous argument, the right-hand side of (2.3) provides
an index for assessing the incentives to exercise market power. However, it re-
lies on knowledge of forward market positions. In some cases, forward contract
positions are available to the market monitor. For example, in the context of a
real-time market, the positions from the day-ahead market constitute forward
financial positions.
To summarize, given the derivative of the inverse residual demand faced
by a market participant, it is possible to evaluate the incentives to mark up
price above marginal cost. This incentive can be used as an index of market
power that, together with a threshold value of “large” for the index, consti-
tutes a screening tool for market power. Unlike other indices such as HHI as
applied to electricity markets (particularly “HHI” based on capacity rather
than market share [64, §4-3.3]) this index is based on a principled analysis of
the underlying economic incentives.
In addition to estimating the price-cost mark-up for generator k, three
further indices of market power that we will show to be useful:





• the derivative of price with respect to injection at bus k, which can be
calculated from the derivative of the inverse residual demand by adding
to it the slope of the offer by generator k, and
• the estimated excess wealth transfer to generator k, (2.2) or (2.4).
The analysis so far does not consider the issue of transmission con-
straints. No extensions of first principles analysis to the case of transmission
constraints in meshed systems have been reported in the literature. In Sec-
tion 2.2, an approach will be proposed to extending this principled analysis to
a meshed transmission system.
Before discussing the proposed approach to meshed systems, however,
we will first discuss the case of a single radial transmission constraint in Sec-
tion 2.1.2. Although a single radial transmission constraint is an unrealistic
situation in the context of an LMP market, it will help to explain and mo-
tivate the more complex and realistic context of a meshed system. Then, in
Section 2.1.3, we will discuss existing approaches to treating market power in
the presence of transmission constraints in a meshed system.
2.1.2 Principled analysis of radial transmission constraints
In a system with a single transmission line joining two zones, as shown
in Figure 2.1, whenever there is transmission congestion between the zones,
the two zones are separated into two markets. In this case, analysis of residual
demand involves considering each zone separately. Consequently, it is straight-
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Figure 2.1: Two zone
network joined by ra-
dial transmission. For
a radial line, the abso-
lute value of shift fac-
tors is always either zero
or one. Consequently,
given that the transmis-
sion constraint is bind-
ing, the two zone system
can be validly analyzed
as two separate markets.
forward to extend the approach in [64] [70] to analyze the residual demand in
each zone when the single constraint is binding.
Such analysis is possible in radial systems because of a particular feature
of the “shift factors,” that is, the fraction of power flowing on a line due to
injection at one zone and withdrawal at another zone. For a radial line, the
absolute value of shift factors is always either zero or one. Consequently, given
that the transmission constraint is binding, the two zone system can be validly
analyzed as two separate markets.
However, in meshed systems, the shift factors are typically between
minus and plus one, so that market participants cannot be unequivocally par-
titioned into zones. The complexity of meshed systems has prompted ad hoc
approaches that will be discussed in the next section.
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2.1.3 Ad hoc analyses of market power with transmission con-
straints
In contrast to the discussion in Section 2.1.1, which started with an un-
derlying economic model of profit maximization to define an index of market
power, this section will consider examples of ad hoc analyses that attempt to
analyze market power in the presence of transmission constraints in a meshed
system. The lack of representation of economic incentives of these ad hocmeth-
ods motivates us to develop new indices that extend first principles analysis
to the case of transmission constraints.
In the ERCOT nodal market there are several ad hoc methods are used
to to assess market power. One of them, the “Element Competitiveness Index”
(ECI), is styled as an ex ante test of competitiveness in the face of transmission
constraints. In particular, it is performed to “[d]etermine if there is sufficient
competition to resolve the [transmission] constraints on the import and export
side” [21, §3.19]. There are several parts to this complicated test involving
capacity of generators and shift factors for potentially binding transmission
constraints. To summarize, the main features of the ECI test are:
• it is based on capacity of generators, and
• it is based on shift factors, and
• it considers each transmission constraint separately.
At its heart, the ECI test is an HHI test based on capacity. As Stoft
points out [64, §4-3.3], despite the use of capacity-based HHI measures by
29
various regulatory authorities, there is no theoretical justification for capacity-
based HHIs as a measure of market power. When HHIs are based on market
shares instead of capacities, there is a connection to the Cournot model, where
all suppliers choose, without coordination, the levels of production to maximize
their profit [§4-3.2] [64]. However, even such share-based HHIs are unreliable as
a measure of market power since they omit consideration of supply and demand
elasticity and of forward contract positions, which are essential determinants
of market power [64, §4-5.1] [9].
Although the ECI test incorporates, through the shift factors, a proxy
for the geographical extent of the market, it fundamentally omits the drivers
of market power: the “residual demand” faced by market participants and the
forward contract positions. In particular, the ECI test is not based on any
offer information [21, §3.19].
Moreover, the ECI test considers each line separately and therefore does
not consider the effect of interactions between constraints on market power.
As will be illustrated in the case studies in Section 2.4, typically, more than one
constraint is binding in a large system. The focus in the ECI and other tests
such as PJM’s “three pivotal supplier test” [50, Appendix J] is on particular
lines. However, in fact, the key economic issue should be the incentives to
market participants at particular buses due to potentially multiple interacting
constraints. The ECI test is likely to obscure the locus of the fundamental
economic incentives.
Another approach to monitoring market power is proposed in [41], and
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is based on the sensitivity of the dispatch of generators to prices under trans-
mission constraints. As an extension of [41], [38] uses revenue-price sensitivities
to estimate price mark-ups above competitive levels. Note that the calculation
of sensitivities in [41] does not represent the variation of price with genera-
tion as specified by the offers. However, representing the offers is essential to
characterizing the incentives for a generator to exercise market power. As an-
other example, [37] describes a sensitivity-based approach, which utilizes shift
factors corresponding to binding transmission constraints, to find clusters of
generators that can perturb market-clearing prices without affecting the dis-
patch. However, this analysis fails to consider the impacts of transmission
constraints on the market outcome in a principled manner, because incentives
faced by firms are not incorporated.
To summarize, these approaches that consider Kirchhoff’s laws in the
assessment of market power have omitted fundamental economic incentives.
As will be discussed in the next section, the indices we develop are based on
analysis of incentives to market participants at each bus.
2.2 Transmission-Constrained Market Power Indices
In previous work, [72] describes calculation of derivatives of the inverse
residual demand faced by a given generator at a single bus, assuming that
offers are differentiable. To evaluate derivatives given a market-clearing re-
sult based on solution of an optimal power flow (OPF), we need the following
information: shift factors for binding constraints, market-clearing quantity of
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each generator, and generator offers. The calculation of derivatives is compu-
tationally efficient given the market-clearing results.
To be concrete, consider generator k located at bus k. (The case where
there are multiple generators owned by different firms at a single bus is similar.
We discuss the case where a firm owns multiple generators at different buses
in Section 3.2.) The calculation of derivative of the inverse residual demand at
bus k considers the effects of binding transmission constraints and quantita-
tively evaluates the decrease in residual demand elasticity faced by generator
k when transmission constraints are binding.
Suppose that H ∈ Rb×w is the matrix of shift factors for injection at
marginal generators j 6= k to the b binding constraints in the system at the
market-clearing conditions, with bus k chosen to be the (price) reference bus
and assuming that there are w marginal generators j 6= k. That is, ∀`,H`j is
the amount of power flowing on constrained line ` given a unit injection at bus j
and withdrawal at bus k. Note that the generators g 6= k at their full capacities
are excluded from the calculation, since their injections are assumed to be fixed
in the sensitivity analysis. Furthermore, let Λ ∈ Rw×w be a diagonal matrix
whose diagonal entries are the inverses of the derivatives of the offers at buses
other than bus k, evaluated at the market-clearing conditions. Then, from [72],
the derivative of inverse residual demand faced by generator k evaluated at









where 1 ∈ Rw is the vector of all ones and superscript > means transpose.
That is, to calculate the derivative of the inverse residual demand for generator
k, we need the following:
• The derivative of the offer curve of each generator j 6= k evaluated at
the market-clearing quantity, and
• The shift factor to the binding transmission lines for injection at each
generator j 6= k and withdrawal at generator k.
The derivative of the inverse residual demand provides the first of four
proposed indices for transmission-constrained market power, and shows the
level of price responsiveness faced by the generator at bus k due to the com-
bination of offers and transmission constraints in the rest of the system. A
second index is the derivative of price with respect to injection. This second
index shows the level of price responsiveness at bus k including all offers and
transmission constraints in the system, including the offer at bus k. It shows
the level of price responsiveness faced by, for example, a new entrant at bus k.
We develop two further indices of the market conditions faced by the
generator at bus k that depend on the transmission-constrained derivative of
the residual demand. These indices are conceptually straightforward exten-
sions of the development in Section 2.1.1 to the transmission-constrained case.
That is, they are based on analyzing the incentives to a profit-maximizing
market participant, assuming that each market participant owns generation
at only a single bus.
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As a third index, substitute into the right-hand side of (2.3):
• the market-clearing injection at bus k, qk = q?k;
• the forward contract quantity, qfk; and





The expression that is derived provides the estimated price-cost mark-up,
again assuming that sufficient conditions for profit maximization are satis-
fied, that p−k and the cost ck are differentiable, and that generator capacity
constraints are not binding at the profit maximum. As a fourth index of
transmission-constrained market power, excess wealth transfer can be esti-
mated using (2.4).
In contrast to, say, ECI, the index (2.3) has a concrete interpretation in
terms of market power: it estimates the mark-up of price above marginal cost
for a hypothetical profit-maximizing generator. If forward contract informa-
tion was not available then −qk
∂p−k
∂qk
(qk) could be used as an index instead;
however, any subsequent market-power mitigation should be sensitive to the
implications of forward contracting on market power. The index (2.4) also has
a concrete interpretation: it estimates the excess transfer above competitive
levels.
To summarize, four indices of transmission-constrained market power
developed in this section are:
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• the derivative of the inverse residual demand (DIRD),
• the derivative of price with respect to injection (DPI),
• the estimated price-cost mark-up (EPM), and
• the estimated wealth transfer over competitive levels (EWT).
Calculation and visualization of these indices is described in the next section.
2.3 Implementation
We have implemented the prototype calculation of the four indices de-
veloped in Section 2.2 using Matlab [39] and PowerWorld [53]. Figure 2.2
shows the flow chart of the tool design. Given generation offer cost data, load
data, and transmission network data, PowerWorld first solves the OPF model.
With the results from the OPF solution, the market power index is evaluated
using Matlab. We ignore forward contracts. The calculated market power
index is then displayed on contour maps using PowerWorld to help market
monitor understand the levels of competition on a geographical map. The
following sections discuss implementation in detail.
2.3.1 PowerWorld OPF
Using linear programming (LP), PowerWorld solves the OPF in a DC
model, which is a linear approximation of the “full” non-linear AC network
model. The PowerWorld OPF implements various representations of cost
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Figure 2.2: Flow chart of tool design for market power indices. Given generation
offer cost data, load data, and transmission network data, PowerWorld solves the
OPF model. With the results from the OPF solution, the market power index is
evaluated using Matlab. The calculated market power index is then displayed on
contour maps using PowerWorld to help market monitor understand the competitive
situation geographically.
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curves. In the context of an electricity market, the cost data used by the
OPF corresponds to the integral of the offers. We utilize the representation in
PowerWorld that allows for cubic (or lower degree) cost curves (correspond-
ing to quadratic or lower degree offer curves). This guarantees that the offers
are differentiable, consistent with the assumption in the analysis of residual
demand as developed in [72]. However, the cubic cost curves require that
piecewise-constant and other non-smooth offers be smoothed.1
Generator data including cost data, transmission network data, and
load data are utilized by PowerWorld to calculate the OPF. From the OPF
solution, several other files are produced in order to calculate the market power
index as described in more detail in the next section.
2.3.2 Market power indices calculation in Matlab
The files produced by PowerWorld are passed to Matlab for calculation
of the indices. In order to avoid matrix inversion and to avoid ill-conditioning
issues, QR factorization and forwards and backwards substitution is used to
evaluate (2.5). The four indices, DIRD, DPI, EPM, and EWT, are evaluated
for each generator.
1Since LP is used in PowerWorld, the polynomial cost curves are approximated by
piecewise-linear curves for calculations within PowerWorld.
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2.3.3 Visualization
Market monitors are likely to benefit from figures that can show the
varying levels of competitiveness at different buses on a geographical map, es-
pecially for a large interconnected system. PowerWorld contour function is a
visualization tool commonly used in the industry [47]. We therefore use Pow-
erWorld to display the indices with color contours. As showned in Figure 2.2,
the computed market power indices are passed to PowerWorld for display.
2.3.4 Piecewise-constant offer functions
Electricity markets typically adopt non-differentiable offer curves, for
example, ERCOT, Midwest ISO, and the Southwest Power Pool, use piece-
wise linear offers [21, §4.4.9.3 and 6.4.3] [40, §4.2.2.2.1] [63, §5.4]. In some
markets, offers can only be specified by piecewise-constant functions. Non-
differentiable offer curves, especially piecewise-constant offers, pose difficulties
for calculating the indices since the offer slopes at the market-clearing quan-
tities might be infinite or 0. As discussed in [69], due to the large number of
price increments allowed for each generator, plus the large number of genera-
tors in a market, the number of steps in the residual demand curve faced by
any market participant is typically large, especially in the neighborhood of the
market clearing quantity. Therefore, this issue can be dealt with by fitting a
smooth curve to the piecewise-constant offer function in the neighborhood of
the market-clearing quantity, so that the average slope in the vicinity of the
market clearing quantity is estimated.
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Figure 2.3: Piecewise-constant residual demand and its fitted quadratic curve near
50MW.
Although smoothing out the piecewise-constant offers introduces some
errors, this approximation seems to work well given that the number of steps
in the residual demand curve is large. The following example shows how
smoothing out the offer does not necessarily introduce serious errors into the
estimation of the mark-up. Consider generator k facing a residual demand
curve as shown in Figure 2.3: $100/MWh for [0 10) MW, $90/MWh for [10
20) MW, $70/MWh for [20 25) MW, $65/MWh for [25 35) MW, $60/MWh for
[35 50) MW, $50/MWh for [50 55) MW, $40/MWh for [55 80) MW, $35/MWh
for [80 85) MW, and $30/MWh for [85 100) MW. Assume that the operating
cost of generator k is 0.1Q2 + 20Q.
We claim that the profit-maximizing quantity of the generator would
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be (just less than) 50 MW, with a clearing price of approximately $60/MWh.
To see this note that:
• if generator k were to produce more than 50 MW then the price would
drop by $10/MWh from $60/MWh to $50/MWh and profit would drop
by around $10/MWh × 50 MW,
• if generator k produces somewhat less than 50 MW then the price would
stay the same, and the price would be above marginal cost, but the
generator would sell less, lowering its profit, and
• if generator k produces significantly less than 50 MW in order to drive
prices up to $65/MWh then the production would be reduced by around
15 MW and profit would decrease by around $300/h or more.
Given the profit-maximizing condition for generator k, its actual mark-up is
$30/MWh.
By fitting a quadratic curve to the offer in the neighborhood of 50MW
(from 20MW to 80MW, see dashed curve in Figure 2.3) and estimating the
slope of the fitted curve at the market-clearing quantity 50MW, the approx-
imated slope of the offer is −0.6196($/MWh)/MW. Based on this slope, the
estimated price-cost mark-up is $30.98/MWh, which is very close to the ac-
tual mark-up. This example shows that smoothing offer can give a reasonable
approximation to the actual mark-up in this case.
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One reason why the approximation of the derivative does not necessarily
produce a large error is related to the assumption of profit maximization; the
change in price and change in quantity to adjacent segments must be such as
to involve a decrease in profits. This effect is well approximated by the average
slope over several adjacent segments.
In our market power indices tool, non-decreasing quadratic curves are
used to fit the piecewise-constant offers near the market-clearing quantities and
the average offer slopes over several adjacent segments are evaluated based on
the quadratic curves. Note that this post-processing step for the offer functions
is only required for calculating the residual demand derivatives, while the OPF
solver still uses piecewise-constant offers to clear the market.
2.4 Case studies
This section demonstrates the use of indices in the context of the IEEE
118-bus Reliability Test System and the ERCOT system. We will show that
these four indices provide different insights about market power, which should
assist market monitors to better understand the competitive situation in the
markets.
2.4.1 IEEE 118-Bus Reliability Test System
Power flow data for the IEEE 118-bus Reliability Test System [54] to-
gether with generic cost data were used to create a data set for PowerWorld.
An OPF was solved for this system with all pre-contingency thermal limits
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Figure 2.4: Contour map of absolute value of index DIRD for the 118-bus Reliability
Test System. The units are ($/MWh)/GW. Many buses in the system are such that
the residual demand faced at that bus is not significantly affected by the transmission
constraints (in blue contours). The red contours in the upper left suggests that
changes in injection at that bus would significantly affect prices.
imposed. An evaluated index for each bus is displayed in color contours on a
geographical map according to a predefined mapping between index value and
color. For the regions without any bus, since no index value is specified, Pow-
erWorld just automatically interpolates the color contours in these regions [52]
.
Figure 2.4 shows the the contours of the index DIRD for this system,
given offers equal to generic marginal costs. Note that four transmission con-
straints (shown by the four light blue “pie charts” labelled as 100% flow) are
binding in this system.
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Figure 2.5: Contour map of absolute value of the index DPI on for the 118-bus
Reliability Test System. The units are ($/MWh)/GW. The contours are qualita-
tively similar to those in Figure 2.4. However, the magnitudes of the derivative are
smaller, reflecting the the effect of inclusion of the offers at each bus in the index
DPI. This figure suggests the levels of competition faced by a new market entrant.
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Figure 2.4 indicates the competitive situation faced by generators at
the buses, as determined by the shift factors to binding constraints, market-
clearing quantities, and the offers. The large blue regions in the figure imply
that buses in these regions have the same or very close values of the DIRD.
Other buses are somewhat affected by the transmission constraints, as shown
by the green contours.
However, one bus in this system has a significantly greater magnitude
for the index DIRD, as shown by the red contours in the upper left of the
system near to two of the binding transmission constraints. This indicates that
changes in injection at this bus would significantly affect prices. Generation at
this bus would potentially be flagged by market monitors for further market
power analysis.
Figure 2.5 shows the contours of the index DPI for the Reliability Test
System. The contours are qualitatively similar to those in Figure 2.4. How-
ever, the magnitudes of the derivative are smaller, reflecting the the effect of
inclusion of the offers at each bus in the derivative of price with respect to
injection. Figure 2.4 suggests the levels of competition that would be faced by
a new market entrant.
Figure 2.6 shows the index EPM according to (2.1). Many buses have a
very low estimate, as shown by the dark to light blue contours. However, it is
interesting to note that even in the regions of low magnitude of DIRD, the EPM
can still be moderately high, as shown by the green contours. Unsurprisingly,
the bus that has a high value of magnitude for its DIRD also has a high EPM,
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Figure 2.6: Contour map of the index EPM for the 118-bus Reliability Test System.
The units are $/MWh. Many buses have a very low estimate, as shown by the dark
to light blue contours. However, it is interesting to note that even in the regions of
low magnitude of DIRD (see Figure 2.4), the EPM can still be moderately high, as
shown by the green contours. In other words, the EPM provide some insights about
market power that are complementary to the DIRD.
as indicated by the red contours. Figure 2.7 shows the contours of the EWT
according to (2.2). There is a generator (in red contours closed to the left
margin of the figure) that has large EWT, but only with moderate EPM. This
results imply that market monitors may need indices with different insights
about market power to better understand the strategic behavior of generators.
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Figure 2.7: Contour map of index EWT for the 118-bus Reliability Test System.
The units are $/h. There is a generator (in red contours closed to the left margin
of the figure) that has large EWT, but only with moderate EPM. This observation
suggests that market monitors may need various indices to better understand the
strategic behavior of generators.
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2.4.2 ERCOT system
Power flow data for the ERCOT system based on summer peak in 2007,
together with generic cost data2 is used to create a data set for PowerWorld.
A security-constrained OPF is solved for this system with all thermal pre- and
single post-contingency constraints enforced except for those post-contingency
constraints that could not be satisfied, such as those involving
• radially connected generators,
• radially connected loads, and
• nearby normally open circuit breakers that could be closed in the event
of the contingency to mitigate an overload.
We do not enforce voltage constraints since the coupling between voltage and
the market outcomes is typically weak [34].
There are three binding pre-contingency constraints and sixteen binding
post-contingency constraints at the OPF solution, indicating the importance
of considering multiple interacting constraints. The index DIRD is calculated
from the solution of the security-constrained OPF according to (2.5) and is
shown in Figure 2.8 (on a common log scale). Most areas in ERCOT have
relatively small magnitudes for DIRD. However, generators in several regions,
2For instance, for a 600MW coal-fired generation unit, the marginal cost curve, repre-
sented as a linear function, ranges from $24-30/MWh. As another example, for a 400MW
gas-fired steam turbine, the marginal cost curve, also represented as a linear function, ranges
from $63-71/MWh.
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Figure 2.8: Contour map of common log of index DIRD for the ERCOT Sys-
tem. The units are ($/MWh)/MW. Most areas in the ERCOT have relatively small
magnitude of DIRD. However, generators in several regions, indicated by the red
contours, face quite inelastic residual demand. The red contours near Austin are
particularly noticeable, presumably because several generators in the region have
large shift factors to a binding transmission constraint.
indicated by the red contours, face quite inelastic residual demand. The red
contours near Austin are particularly noticeable, presumably because several
generators in the region have large shift factors to a binding transmission con-
straint. Compared with the DIRD, the index DPI has much smaller magni-
tude, as shown in Figure 2.9. This figure suggests that the level of competition
that would be faced by a new market entrant is likely to be strong at all buses.
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Figure 2.9: Contour map of derivative of price respect to injection for the ERCOT
System. The units are ($/MWh)/MW. Compared with the DIRD, the index DPI
has much smaller magnitude, as shown in Figure 2.9. This figure suggests that the
level of competition faced by a new entrant is likely to be strong in each bus.
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Figure 2.10 shows the index EPM (on a common log scale) according
to (2.1) for buses in the ERCOT system. Most of ERCOT has relatively low
values for the EPM. However there are several regions of moderate EPM and
one region with very large EPM near Austin. This is presumably due to bind-
ing transmission constraints impeding the import of power into these regions.
The index EPM of more than 5 million $/MWh are unrealistic given the (un-
modeled) levels of forward contract cover and offer caps. If this information
were known, more realistic estimates could be obtained that would more likely
reveal the incentives for generators to drive up the prices. Figure 2.11 shows
the index EWT (on a common log scale) according to (2.2). Some regions
near Austin have moderately high EWT (in yellow contours) but small EPM
(in light blue contours). This observation implies that these indices provide
different insights about market power that should help market monitor better
understand the competitive situation.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter developed four indices of market power in the context of
transmission-constrained electricity markets. Unlike ad hoc methods adopted
in most electricity markets, the proposed indices incorporate economic prin-
ciples and faithfully represent the effects of Kirchhoff’s laws. Techniques for
efficient implementation are also developed. Case studies show that these four
indices provide different insights about market power and help market moni-
tors better understand the strategic behaviors of market participants. These
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Figure 2.10: Contour map of common log of the index EPM (in $/MWh) for the
ERCOT system. Most of ERCOT has relatively low values for the EPM. However
there are several regions of moderate EPM and one region with very large EPM near
Austin. This is presumably due to binding transmission constraints near Austin
impeding the import of power into these regions.
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Figure 2.11: Contour map of common log of the index EWT (in $/h) for the
ERCOT system. Some regions nearby Austin have moderately high EWT (in yellow
contours) but small EPM (in light blue contours). This observation implies that
these indices provide different insights about market power that may help market
monitor better understand the competitive situation.
52
indices could be evaluated in different contexts, such as:
• part of an ex ante simulation of market operation over pricing intervals
in a time horizon using a production cost simulator, either based on com-
petitive offers or based on some assumed strategic offers; this simulation
helps market monitors predict the existence of market power; and
• part of an ex post analysis by a market monitor, based on historical
offer information. This analysis helps market monitor apply appropriate
market-power mitigation rules to restore prices to competitive levels.
The next chapter generalizes the analysis based on economic principles
to a situation in which a market participant owns generation assets in different
buses, which is typically the case in real-world electricity markets.
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Chapter 3
Firm-based Market Power Indices
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 presented four new market power indices in transmission-
constrained electricity markets. But one key assumption in developing those
indices is rarely valid: all generators that a market participant owns are collo-
cated. In this chapter, this assumption is relaxed and two different approaches
for analyzing firm-based market power considering transmission constraints
are proposed. The first one is based on “small-signal” analysis, while the
other is based on “large-signal” analysis. They provide different insights into
market power and can both be integrated into market power analysis. Both
approaches analyze market power for a single market-clearing interval but, be-
cause of their computational efficiency, could also be applied repeatedly over
multiple market-clearing intervals to assess the average.
The first approach generalizes the principled analysis proposed in Chap-
ter 2, which is based on the the transmission-constrained residual demand
derivative that was described in [72]. Unlike ad hoc approaches (see Section
2.1.3), the four market power indices in Chapter 2 represent the incentives
faced by a firm, including the effects of Kirchhoff’s laws. That analysis is an
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ex post assessment based on offer information and market-clearing results, and
is computationally efficient.
A limitation of the indices in Chapter 2, however, is that each gen-
eration firm is assumed to own generation assets at only a single bus. In
reality, firms often own assets located at multiple buses having different lo-
cational marginal prices (LMP). As shown by an example in [17], strategic
behavior of firms with assets at multiple buses can be qualitatively different
to the simpler case analyzed in Chapter 2. In this chapter, based on the Ja-
cobian of the inverse residual demand function (JIRD) described in [73], we
extend the transmission-constrained market power indices to the case that a
firm has assets at multiple locations, and propose an analogous firm-based
transmission-constrained market power index (TCMPI).
We also propose a second approach to assess firm-based market power:
the transmission-constrained residual supply index (TCRSI), which generalizes
the residual supply index (RSI) [59] [60] to the case of binding transmission
constraints. The RSI was developed by the California ISO (CAISO) and is
used to predict market power in the CAISO and some other markets. The
RSI reflects the degree to which a firm’s offers are necessary to meet demand.
Empirical results indicate that the RSI is strongly correlated to the exercise
of market power. However, the original RSI definition ignores the effects of
transmission constraints and might be less helpful in the context of LMP
markets.
The CAISO uses “competitive path assessment” to determine the com-
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petitiveness of each transmission constraint [14]. However, this approach fo-
cuses on the degree of violation of transmission capacity constraints needed
to meet demand without a given firm’s supply, whereas our approach directly
generalizes the RSI to the case of transmission constraints. The TCRSI pro-
posed here can efficiently assess the extent to which a firm is “pivotal” when
transmission constraints bind.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 introduces
the TCMPI. Section 3.3 provides case studies of the TCMPI. Section 3.4 de-
velops the TCRSI. Section 3.5 provides case studies of the TCRSI. Section 3.6
compares these two approaches and Section 3.7 concludes. Our discussion will
not treat forward contracts explicitly, but the analysis can easily be modified
to include the effect of exogenously specified forward contracts.
3.2 Firm-based Transmission-Constrained Market Power
Index
To develop the firm-based transmission-constrained market power in-
dex, we first analyze the incentives for a firm to profitably alter the prices from
competitive levels. Then we discuss how to compute the index efficiently and
provide some examples.
3.2.1 Principles-based analysis of firm-based market power
Suppose that firm i owns generators at buses k ∈ Ki, where |Ki| = r.
We collect the production quantities qk, k ∈ Ki, at all these generators into
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a vector q ∈ Rr. Assume that p−k : Rr → R is the resulting market-clearing
price at bus k given that the firm produces the quantities q. That is, p−k is
the inverse residual demand function for firm i at bus k. We collect the inverse
residual demands p−k, k ∈ Ki, together into a vector function p : Rr → Rr.
Note that the inverse residual demand faced by a generator at bus k
depends on the whole vector q. That is, actions by the firm at any one of its
generators may result in a change in the price at bus k.
We now assume that firms are profit maximizers and consider the con-
dition for firm i to maximize its profit. Assume that the production cost
functions of the firm are specified by the cost functions ck : R → R, k ∈ Ki.
Ignoring forward contracts, the profit for the market participant is:










qkp−k(q) is the total revenue of firm i. (The case with
exogenously specified forward contracts is similar.) We first consider the case
where the capacity constraints of the generators owned by firm i are not bind-
ing and then consider the more general case.
3.2.1.1 Ignoring generator capacity constraints
Assuming that sufficient conditions for maximization are satisfied, that
p and ck, k ∈ Ki, are differentiable, and that generator capacity constraints
of firm i are not binding, we can maximize the profit of firm i by setting the
partial derivatives of profit with respect to quantities equal to zero. Focusing
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is the marginal cost of the generator owned by firm i at bus
m. Re-arranging the above equation, we obtain the price-cost mark-up at bus
m under the hypothesis that the firm was maximizing its profits:







This is a generalization of (2.1) to the case of firms owning multiple genera-
tors. In the firm-based analysis, the profit-maximizing mark-up at generator




To aggregate all the estimated mark-ups into a single index for firm i,



























(q) is JIRD evaluated at q, superscript > means transpose, and
1 ∈ Rr is the vector of all ones. Note that the matrix ∂p
∂q
(q) is symmetric
and negative semi-definite, as proved in [6] and [73]. Therefore, the estimated




for k 6= m can be positive, it may be the
case that, at some buses, profit maximization corresponds to a mark-down
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rather than a mark-up. That is, for some buses m, the estimated mark-up
in (3.1) may be negative. While this seems to be counter-intuitive, Hogan [27]
and Cardell et al. [17] describe just such a case where a firm offers below
marginal cost at bus e on the exporting side of a constraint in order to con-
gest the line and consequently be able to offer well above marginal cost at













(q) is significantly positive. The mark-up at each bus considered
separately does not, in this case, give a full picture of the situation faced by a
firm. However, the index (3.2) combines the effect of mark-up at all buses.
To summarize, the TCMPI proposed here is the quantity-weighted av-
erage of estimated price-cost mark-ups of firm i in (3.2). This estimate as-
sumes that the firm is maximizing its profits and that the firm can evaluate
the residual demand it faces. As discussed in Section 2.1.1, even given these
assumptions, these must be viewed as only approximate estimates of mark-up
over competitive prices, since competitive prices at each bus m may deviate
from the marginal costs c′m(qm) at the market-clearing conditions. Moreover,
to estimate the mark-ups above competitive prices more precisely, it is neces-
sary to consider the generator capacity constraints, which will be discussed in
the following two sections, 3.2.1.2 and 3.2.1.3.
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3.2.1.2 Considering binding generator capacity constraints at market-
clearing conditions
To consider the case of generators at their maximum capacity at market-
clearing conditions, partition the generators owned by firm i into generators
that are:
• at their maximum capacity, denoted by subscript f for fixed, and
• marginal, denoted by subscript v for variable.
The mark-up of each generator m owned by firm i that is marginal is still
given by (3.1). Collect the mark-ups of the marginal generators owned by firm
i into the vector ∆pv. Writing pv and pf for the vector functions representing









In contrast, the mark-up, ∆pf , of the generators at their maximum ca-
pacity will not satisfy the condition (3.1). Moreover, there would be non-zero
“mark-up” of prices for such generators even with competitive offers since gen-
erators at their maximum capacity receive infra-marginal rents. This “mark-
up” with competitive offers does not represent excess transfer above competi-
tive levels. Nevertheless, above-competitive offers by the marginal generators
owned by firm i would result in even higher mark-ups at the other generators
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and we will estimate this effect to estimate the mark-up above competitive
prices for the generators at maximum capacity. We will not attempt to esti-
mate the higher mark-up of firm i’s generators at maximum capacity that is
due to other firms’ actions.
In particular, for the generators owned by firm i that are at maximum
capacity, we will estimate the mark-up ∆pf of prices at their buses that is due
to the mark-ups at the marginal generators owned by firm i. We will estimate
∆pf by considering the change ∆qv at the marginal generators of firm i that
would result in changing the prices at those buses by ∆pv. By definition of

























and ignore capacity constraints of generators that are marginal at the market-
























































































(q) can be singular. This occurs, for example, if multi-
ple marginal generators are located at the same bus and therefore have the
same shift factors with respect to all binding constraints, or if the number
of marginal generators owned by firm i is greater than the number of bind-
ing constraints. In this case, we use the analogous expression to (3.5) that
utilizes the pseudo-inverse of
∂pv
∂qv
(q) [12, §A.5.4]. Using the pseudo-inverse
results in a proxy to ∆qv that has the least Euclidean norm, and thus acts to
under-estimate the profit-maximizing generation weighted mark-up.
Again, the TCMPI in (3.5) may also act to over-estimate the mark-up
above competitive prices to the extent that competitive prices deviate from
the marginal costs at the market-clearing conditions. Note that all generators
are assumed to reveal their true capacity. In the particular case where all of
firm i’s generators are at maximum capacity, we define the index to be zero.
As mentioned above, this ignores the effect of other firms on the mark-up of
firm i, which acts to under-estimate the mark-up above competitive prices in
this case. On the other hand, by ignoring capacity constraints of generators
that are marginal at the market-clearing condition, the index over-estimates
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the actual mark-up over competitive conditions. We will consider the issue in
the next section.
3.2.1.3 Considering binding generator capacity constraints at com-
petitive conditions
In (3.4), ∆qv, the estimated generation output deviation from the case
that firm i behaves competitively, does not consider the generation capacity
constraints at the competitive condition:
q
v
≤ qv −∆qv ≤ qv, (3.6)
where qv−∆qv represents the estimated production quantities at the competi-
tive condition, and qv, qv are the vectors of maximum and minimum generation
capacities. Let V be the set of generators owned by firm i that are marginal
at the market-clearing condition. Also define V f and V v as subsets of V which
represent binding and marginal generators at the competitive condition, re-
spectively. Note that V f , V v ⊆ V and V f = V \ V v. Assuming sets V f , V v are
known, we partition generators in V into generators that are:
• in set V f , denoted by subscript vf,
• in set V v, denoted by subscript vv.
Collect the mark-ups of the generators in sets V f and V v into vectors ∆pvf
and ∆pvv, respectively. Also, collect the production quantities deviated from
the competitive condition of generators in set V f and V v into vectors ∆qvf and
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By definition of set V f , we have
∆qvf = qvf − qvf . (3.8)


























as discussed in 3.2.1.2. Combining (3.7) and (3.9), the estimated mark-ups




















Furthermore, according to (3.4), the estimated mark-ups above competitive















where ∆qvf and ∆qvv are given by (3.8) and (3.9), respectively. The estimated





















Output: a conjectured V f
V f ← ∅, V v ← V
repeat
T ← ∅
Calculate ∆qvv using equation (3.9)
for each i in V v do
if qi −∆qi > qi then
T ← T ⋃{i}
end if
end for
V f ← V f ⋃T , V v ← V v \ T
until V f = V or T = ∅
The analysis above is based on the assumption that either set V f or
V v is known. However, this information is usually not available as a priori.
Therefore, a procedure is developed to conjecture the set V f . The basic idea
is to iteratively calculate ∆qvv based on (3.9) and move generators violating
capacity constraints from V v to V f , until the capacity constraints (3.6) are
satisfied for all generators in V . Algorithm 1 describes the main steps of this
procedure.
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In this algorithm, at least one generator is added to set V f at each iter-
ation, or otherwise the algorithm terminates. Therefore, the above algorithm
is guaranteed to terminate in no more than |V | iterations. Minimum pro-
duction constraints can also be included in the same manner to deal with the
case that the estimated generation outputs at competitive conditions are lower
than their minimum production levels. Note that this procedure only provides
a conjecture about the set V f , which might differ from the actual set of binding
generators at the competitive condition. Also, since the estimated price-cost
mark-ups for generators in V v are used to approximate the mark-ups above
competitive prices, the index might still over-estimate the mark-ups above
competitive levels, particularly under the case that the derivatives of marginal
costs are greater than zero.
3.2.2 Evaluation of market power index
The key to evaluating the TCMPI is to efficiently evaluate the JIRD
∂p
∂q
. Reference [72] describes the calculation of residual demand derivative
when there are binding transmission constraints, using sensitivity analysis of
market-clearing conditions, and [73] extends the methodology to calculate the
JIRD matrix faced by a firm. Given the following information, the JIRD can
be evaluated efficiently:1
1As observed in Chapter 2, in many markets, offers are piecewise-constant. The residual
demand derivative implicitly assumes that the offer is differentiable. From a practical per-
spective, the transmission constrained inverse residual demand derivative is estimating the
change in prices for a small change in injection. Consequently, the average slope of offers
over a suitable small change in production is utilized, as discussed in Section 2.3.4.
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• Binding transmission constraints and their shift factors for injection at
each generator,
• Offer information, and
• Market-clearing quantities.
Once the JIRD is evaluated, we can evaluate the TCMPI based on (3.13).
3.2.3 Implementation
We have implemented the calculation of the TCMPI using the same
framework as in Section 2.3. We use PowerWorld as the OPF solver and visu-
alization tool, and implement the index calculation in MATLAB. Figure 2.2
shows the flow of data in an calculation. Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 demonstrate
the indices and their use for medium- and large-scale systems.
3.3 Case Studies of Firm-Based Transmission-Constrained
Market Power Index
3.3.1 Single firm, no transmission constraints
This example is aimed to show the importance of considering bind-
ing capacity constraints at competitive conditions as discussed in 3.2.1.3. A
single firm owning two generators, a and b, faces a residual demand D − p
MW, where D is a parameter characterizing overall demand level and p is the
market-clearing price. The marginal costs of generator a and b are 10 + 0.1qa
$/MWh and 10 + 0.2qb $/MWh, respectively, where qa and qb are the pro-
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duction quantities. For various values of D, the market-clearing prices are
evaluated for two cases:
• The generation firm maximizes its profit by selecting optimal production
quantities, represented by the blue solid line in Figure 3.1, and
• The generation firm behaves competitively by using marginal costs as
offers, represented by the green dashed line in Figure 3.1.
Note that the firm’s profit-maximizing strategies are obtained using a Cournot
model [68]. Without transmission constraints, we can easily obtain the optimal
production quantities and corresponding prices.
Also, two indices are evaluated for eachD based on the profit-maximizing
case:
• The quantity-weighted average mark-ups considering binding capacity
constraints at competitive conditions based on (3.13) (represented by
the red dashed line in Figure 3.2), and
• The quantity-weighted average mark-ups ignoring capacity constraints at
competitive conditions based on (3.5) (represented by the blue dashed
line in Figure 3.2).
Note that in this particular example, the estimated quantity-weighted mark-
up equals the estimated mark-up of either generator since no transmission
constraints are presented. When D > 230, both generators become binding
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Figure 3.1: Market-clearing prices for the single firm, no transmission constraint ex-
ample. The solid line (“Prof. Max. Price”) represents the prices when the generation
firm maximizes its profit, while the dashed line (“Competitive Price”) represents the
prices when the firm uses marginal costs as offers.
at the competitive condition. However, generator b is still marginal in the
profit-maximizing case for D > 230. In this scenario, as shown in Figure 3.2,
the estimated mark-up given by (3.5) significantly over-estimates the mark-up
above the competitive price, while the estimated mark-up according to (3.13)
corrects this inaccuracy and produces an estimate that is much closer to the
actual mark-up above the competitive price obtained from a Cournot model.
3.3.2 Single firm in IEEE Reliability Test System
This example uses the IEEE 118-bus Reliability Test System to demon-
strate that the TCMPI (3.13) can produce good estimates of the actual mark-
ups above competitive prices. Assume there is a single firm maximizing
its profit by choosing the optimal production quantities given all other sup-
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Figure 3.2: Actual and estimated mark-ups for single firm, no transmission con-
straint example. The blue line (’index’) represents the estimated price mark-ups
according to (3.5), and the red line (’index w/o C.C.C.’) represents the estimated
price mark-ups according to (3.13). This figure shows that considering capacity con-
straints at competitive conditions provide much more accurate estimates of actual
mark-ups.
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pliers’ offers. The profit-maximizing strategies and corresponding market-
clearing prices are computed using a mathematical program with equilib-
rium constraints (MPEC) [17]. Note that MPEC problems are typically non-
convex and thus only guarantee solutions that are local optimal. Given the
profit-maximizing production quantities of the firm and the corresponding
market-clearing information, we compute the estimated mark-ups using (3.5)
and (3.13). Table 3.1 shows the results, where q represents the profit-maximizing
production quantities for the firm, qcomp represents the production quantities
in the competitive condition, and q represents the maximum capacities of each
generator. The minimum capacities are all zero. The actual mark-ups are the
profit-maximizing prices minus the competitive prices and are shown in the
fifth column, with two estimates in the last two columns. As shown in the
Table 3.1, the estimated mark-ups are reasonably good estimates of the actual
mark-ups. The discrepancies in this example are presumably due to non-zero
derivatives of marginal costs. That is, for marginal generators, the price-cost
mark-ups over-estimate the mark-ups above competitive prices, as discussed
in 3.2.1.3. Note that the estimated mark-ups given by (3.5), which ignore ca-
pacity constraints at the competitive condition, significantly over-estimate the
actual mark-ups. Again, this example shows the need to incorporate capacity
constraints at the competitive condition in order to produce more plausible
estimates of mark-ups.
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Figure 3.3: Contour map of firm-based transmission-constrained market power
index for the IEEE 118-bus Reliability Test System. The units are $/MWh. Gen-
erators owned by the same firm are assigned the TCMPI according to (3.13). This
figure suggests that firm A has the ability to drive up the prices, presumably due
one of the binding transmission constraints limiting power imports to the red con-
tour areas. In contrast, the generator-based analysis fails to faithfully represent the
market power owned by firm A.
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Table 3.1: Actual and estimated mark-ups in IEEE 118-bus test system
mark-up
Gen# q qcomp q actual estimates
1 estimates w/o c.c.c2
1 77.75 105.23 162.5 6.69 9.98 9.98
2 58.52 78 78 0.32 -0.08 14.22
3 65 65 65 -0.21 -1.02 20.81
4 45.5 45.5 45.5 -0.38 -1.32 22.89
5 97.5 97.5 97.5 0.61 0.41 9.94
6 45.5 45.5 45.5 1.57 4.83 5.95
7 65 65 65 1.61 5.04 5.86
8 59.91 80.43 97.5 1.38 3.83 6.30
9 36.57 71.81 162.5 1.61 5.04 5.83
quantity-weighted average index 1.60 2.99 11.61
1 Estimated mark-ups considering capacity constraints at competitive conditions.
2 Estimated mark-ups ignoring capacity constraints at competitive conditions.
3.3.3 Multiple firms in IEEE Reliability Test System
Power flow data together with generic generator offers and artificial
ownership data for the IEEE 118-bus Reliability Test System [54] are used
for calculating the TCMPI (3.13). Note that the power flow data and gen-
erator offers are the same set of data as used in Section 2.4.1. This example
demonstrates that the firm-based TCMPI is a more suitable tool for mea-
suring market power in a transmission-constrained market, compared to the
generator-based indices developed in Chapter 2. We assume the generators
belong to six different owners, firms A,...,F, and each firm owns 5 to 13 gen-
erators.
Figure 3.3 shows the contours of the quantity-weighted average index
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according to (3.13). All of the generators owned by the same firm are assigned
the estimated quantity-weighted average for the firm and are displayed in the
same color.2 Note that there are four binding transmission constraints in the
system, which are shown as the light blue pie charts.
The generators in the red contour areas are all owned by firm A, which
has the largest estimated mark-up. This is presumably due to one of the bind-
ing transmission constraints limiting power imports to the red contour areas
and making it less competitive. We will show in Section 3.5.2 that this firm
does possess significant market power considering the effects of transmission
constraints. All the other five firms have fairly small mark-ups and are all
displayed in different colors.3
Comparing Figure 3.3 with Figure 2.6 in Section 2.4.1, it is clear that
the generator-based market power indices proposed in Chapter 2 are not suffi-
cient to analyze the behavior of a firm that owns generators at more than one
location. In this case study, firm A, a pivotal firm as suggested in Section 3.5.2,
has great potential to drive up the prices above the competitive levels. With
the firm-based analysis proposed in this chapter, the estimated average mark-
up of firm A is 48.84 $/MWh, which indicates that firm A should be flagged
as being of concern regarding exercising market power.
2The size of circles in the contours are determined by the parameter “Influence Region”
in PowerWorld. There is no specific meaning on the size of circles of color contours.
3There are several narrow stripes of yellow contours, such as the one between the aqua
and orange contours in the middle of the figure. They are due to blending of colors and do
not represent another firm.
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In contrast, the individual generator analysis in Section 2.4.1 suggests
that all generators owned by firm A have estimated mark-ups less than 3
$/MWh, which are fairly small. In Section 2.4.1, the residual demand is based
on all generation offers other than the generator to be analyzed. However,
to analyze the profit-maximizing incentives for a firm, the offers from all the
generators owned by the firm should be excluded from the residual demand
calculation, since the firm can control the behavior of all its generators to
maximize its profit. Therefore, the firm-based TCMPI is a more suitable tool
to analyze market power of a firm.
3.3.4 ERCOT system
Power flow data together with generic generator offers4 and ownership
and control data for the ERCOT system for summer peak demand are used for
calculating the index. Note that the power flow data and generator offers are
the same set of data as used in Section 2.4.2. We calculated the index based
on security-constrained OPF (SCOPF) solution, assuming all generators are
in-service. This example demonstrates that the firm-based TCMPI is a more
suitable tool for measuring market power in a transmission-constrained mar-
ket, compared to the generator-based indices developed in Chapter 2. There
are 19 binding transmission constraints in the system, with three of them be-
4For instance, for a 600MW coal-fired generation unit, the offer curve, represented as
a linear function, ranges from $24-30/MWh. As another example, for a 400MW gas-fired
steam turbine, the marginal offer, also represented as a linear function, ranges from $63-
71/MWh.
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(a) Common log of transmission-constrained
market power index in $/MWh, except for
purple contour, which has index of zero.
(b) Transmission-constrained residual supply
index (see Section 3.5.3).
Figure 3.4: Contour maps of two firm-based market power analyses for the ER-
COT system. Six largest firms in terms of capacity share are displayed. This figure
shows that the TCMPI and TCRSI are strongly correlated. However, this observa-
tion is not always true for other smaller firms in the system, which is discussed in
Section 3.6.
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ing pre-contingency constraints. Figure 3.4(a) shows the contours of estimated
quantity-weighted average index according to (3.13). The contours represent
the common log of the index. Again, all generators owned by a given firm
are assigned the estimated quantity-weighted average for the firm and are dis-
played in the same color. For clarity, only the six largest firms in terms of
capacity share are shown in the figure. The firm with the largest index is also
the largest firm, which owns about 20% generation capacity. The generators
owned or controlled by this firm are shown in red contours in the figure and
are distributed in several areas in ERCOT. Note that the firm represented by
purple contours has estimated mark-up of 0, since all of its generators are at
full capacity. In the figure, we use a small number, 10−10, to represent this
mark-up, since common log of 0 is not defined.
The result shown in Figure 3.4(a) suggests that the market is much less
competitive compared to the case in Section 2.4.2, where all generators are as-
sumed to be owned by different firms. In Section 2.4.2, only five generators
have estimated mark-ups higher than 1000 $/MWh using generator-based mar-
ket power indices. However, with the firm-based analysis, four firms, with 103
generators, have average estimated mark-ups higher than 1000 $/MWh. We
will show in Section 3.5.3 that these four firms indeed possess significant mar-
ket power under transmission constraints. This example again demonstrates
that the generator-based indices developed in Chapter 2 might underestimate
the firm-based market power in a transmission-constrained market.
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3.4 Transmission-Constrained Residual Supply Index
In this section, we consider another approach to firm-based analysis of
market power. In the absence of binding transmission constraints, the residual
supply index (RSI) of firm i is defined as follows:
RSI =
total available supply − available supply from firm i
demand
The RSI measures the maximum available supply divided by the demand,
without any supply from firm i. When the RSI is less than 1, firm i is said
to be “pivotal” and has significant potential market power. On the other
hand, a larger RSI value implies that firm i has less potential market power.
In [59], empirical evidence of negative correlation between the RSI and price-
cost mark-up was provided. This correlation indicates that the RSI might
be a useful index to predict market power. Newbery [44] concludes that the
RSI is particularly useful for the case of a single dominant firm or symmetric
oligopoly.
However, the basic RSI definition ignores the impact of transmission
constraints. In the presence of transmission constraints, a firm might be pivotal
in particular geographic areas even if from a region-wide perspective (ignor-
ing transmission constraints) there is no pivotal firm. CAISO uses an RSI-like
approach [15] to assess the competitiveness of transmission constraints: it eval-
uates the extent to which a firm’s supply is necessary to produce counter-flow
that relieves congestion on a particular constraint. In addition, CAISO applies
“competitive path assessment” [14] to identify pivotal suppliers under trans-
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mission constraints by repeatedly solving multiple OPFs that successively omit
each given firm’s supply. This approach evaluates the shortfall in transmission
capacity to meet demand and might be computationally expensive because of
the need to solve an OPF for each firm.
In order to generalize the original definition of the RSI into the context
of transmission constraints, but also provide a computationally efficient proce-
dure, we developed a new index, the transmission-constrained residual supply
index (TCRSI). Unlike the approaches adopted by CAISO, the TCRSI directly
generalizes the original definition of the RSI while considering all constraints
simultaneously. The TCRSI can measure the extent to which a firm’s supply
is necessary to meet demand including the effects of transmission constraints.
Generalizing the RSI, the TCRSI of firm i evaluates the residual supply at
each load bus, in the absence of supply from firm i. As will be discussed in the
next section, the TCRSI is represented as a single parameter that scales each
load throughout the system conformally, and can be evaluated by solving a
linear programming (LP) model if the transmission constraints are represented
using DC power flow. The TCRSI can be computed efficiently by utilizing the
dual simplex method, which will be further discussed in Section 3.4.3.
3.4.1 Definition of transmission-constrained residual supply index
Suppose that there are n generators, ` loads, and m transmission con-
straints. Variables q ∈ Rn represent the output quantity of each generator
while d ∈ R` is the vector composed of load quantities, which is given as
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problem data. The matrix Hg ∈ Rm×n consists of the shift factors for injec-
tion at each generator corresponding to each transmission constraint; similarly,
Hd ∈ Rm×` is the matrix of shift factors for injection at each load bus corre-
sponding to each transmission constraint; and b ∈ Rm represents the limits for
the transmission constraints. We assume that qj , j = 1, . . . , n, is the maximum
available supply of each generator j. We again assume that Ki is the set of
generators owned by firm i.





subject to 1>q − (1>d)t = 0 (3.14b)
Hgq −Hd(dt) ≤ b (3.14c)
0 ≤ qj ≤ qj, j /∈ Ki (3.14d)
qj = 0, j ∈ Ki (3.14e)
where:
• (3.14b) is the power balance constraint;
• (3.14c) are transmission constraints;
• (3.14d) are maximum supply constraints;
• (3.14e) remove the supply of firm i.
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With transmission constraints and maximum supply constraints, the above LP
finds the maximum load (1>d)t that the system could meet after removing all
available supply from firm i; in other words, the LP maximizes the residual
supply in the absence of firm i assuming demand is scaled conformally.
Definition 1. The TCRSI for the firm i is the optimal value of the linear
program TCRSI LP, as specified in (3.14).
If the TCRSI is less than 1, it implies that there is insufficient supply
to satisfy all the loads in the system without the supply from firm i; that is
to say, firm i is pivotal. When the TCRSI is greater than 1, the system has
more than enough generation resources to satisfy all demand even without any
supply from firm i. This observation is analogous to the interpretation of RSI.
Note that without the transmission constraints (3.14c), the optimal
value of TCRSI LP evaluates the RSI. Therefore, the RSI can be interpreted
as the optimal value of the relaxed TCRSI LP. Thus for a given firm i, the
value of TCRSI is always less than or equal to the RSI. If a market monitor
uses the TCRSI and RSI as screening tools for market power to flag the firms
whose index is less than a given threshold, the firms that are flagged using
the TCRSI would be a superset of firms flagged by the RSI. In other words,
the TCRSI is a more comprehensive market screening tool since it flags all the
firms that the RSI detects as pivotal, plus some firms that are pivotal due to
transmission constraints that the RSI fails to discover.
The reason for using a single parameter to scale each individual load
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conformally is that loads are distributed throughout the system with certain
geographical patterns. For example, it is usually the case that metropolitan
areas have significantly higher demand than rural areas. This pattern should
be kept while we search for the maximum demand that the system could
provide. In contrast, if each load is modeled as a free variable, the optimal
solution might not represent the geographical distribution of the load in the
system. This issue will be further discussed in Section 3.5.1 with reference to
a small four bus example system.
3.4.2 Implications of transmission-constrained residual supply in-
dex
Unlike the TCMPI analysis, the TCRSI does not directly model the
incentives for a firm to drive the prices above competitive levels. Nevertheless,
as discussed in the first paragraph in Section 3.4, this type of ex ante analy-
sis, which measures the extent to which a firm’s supply is necessary to meet
demand, might provide some useful insights concerning market power.
If the TCRSI of firm i is less than 1, it implies that the system cannot
meet all demand without at least some supply from firm i. Assuming offers
from other market participants are fixed, firm i could submit its generation
offers at any arbitrarily high prices and at least some of its offered supply is
guaranteed to be accepted by the ISO, given that the system has to satisfy
all demand, all transmission constraints must be satisfied, and there exists no
demand elasticity. As a result, a TCRSI value that is less than 1 implies an
82
absolute potential of exercising market power and should be flagged for further
analysis.
In the case that the TCRSI of firm i is equal to or slightly greater than 1,
the system can just meet all demand without the supply from firm i. However,
the operator might need to dispatch some expensive generation resources. In
this situation, firm i can offer strategically, resulting in its generators being
dispatched at prices much higher than competitive levels.
3.4.3 Implementation
Section 3.4.1 defined the TCRSI of a given firm, which is derived from
solving a LP problem. To calculate the TCRSIs for all the market partici-
pants, multiple TCRSI LPs have to be solved. The TCRSI LP problem (3.14)
has a similar structure to an optimal power flow problem (OPF), except for
the difference in the objective function. Solving an OPF is computationally
expensive if the system size is large. Therefore, an efficient implementation is
desired.
The only changes between the TCRSI LP formulation (3.14) for dif-
ferent firms are changes in the generators’ maximum available supply. More
specifically, a different set of generators’ maximum available supplies are sup-
pressed to 0 when formulating the TCRSI LP for each different market partic-
ipant. This characteristic can be exploited by using the dual simplex method
to solve all the TCRSI LPs starting from a dual feasible solution. Once the
TCRSI LP is solved for a given firm, we keep the basis of the current LP, change
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the right-hand sides of the constraints and continue the dual simplex method
until optimality conditions are reached. This technique is called “warm start”
and is supported by most LP solvers5.
We used Gurobi 2.0 as the LP solver and wrote the code in the Python
language to calculate the TCRSI. A small four bus example is first developed
to provide a comparison between RSI and TCRSI. Then the TCRSI is also
evaluated for the two test cases from Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4. Table 3.2 shows
the results of computational performance for these two test cases. We observe
that the computational efficiency for solving a large system is significantly
improved by using warm start, compared to solving TCRSI LP from scratch
for each firm, labeled “Cold start” in Table 3.2.
3.5 Case Studies of the TCRSI
3.5.1 4 Bus System
We use a simple four bus system to illustrate why the TCRSI is a
more suitable index than the RSI in the context of transmission constraints.
Figure 3.5 shows the one-line diagram of the four bus system. There are three
generators and two loads in the network. Suppose that each generator is owned
by a different firm and the subscripts of generators and loads also represent
the bus where they are located. Assume that the transmission line from bus
2 to 3 has a thermal limit of 300MW, while the other lines have sufficiently
5In principle, the same approach could also be used to speed up calculations in the
CAISO “competitive path assessment” approach.
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Table 3.2: Computational performance
Test case Method CPU Time1 Iterations2
118-bus RTS3
Cold start 0.07 419
Warm start 0.06 417
ERCOT4
Cold start 180.3 38983
Warm start 41.5 11310
1 The units are second. Based on 3.0 GHz CPU, 16GB
RAM Linux workstation. Note that for the ERCOT
case, the CPU time does not include the time for solving
SCOPF.
2 Number of total simplex iterations.
3 The Reliability Test System has 118 buses, 54 genera-
tors, 91 loads, and 194 transmission constraints.
4 The ERCOT system has 5526 buses, 3518 loads, 564
generators, and 6836 transmission constraints.






Figure 3.5: One-line diagram of the four bus system. The RSI analysis implies that
there is no pivotal firm. However, the TCRSI of generator 3 is 0.58 and indicates
that generator 3 is a pivotal supplier. The TCRSI reveals that generator 3 has great
potential for exercising market power since it can offer its production at arbitrarily
high prices and consequently drive up the market-clearing prices.
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large thermal limits so that the associated transmission constraints are never
binding.
Table 3.3 shows the TCRSI and RSI of each generator. The RSI analysis
implies that there is no pivotal firm, since the RSI of each firm is greater than
or equal to 1. However, the TCRSI of generator g3 is 0.58 and indicates that
g3 is a pivotal supplier. Without the supply from g3, the maximum conformal
loads the system could serve are 1458.3MW at d0 and 583.3MW at d1, due to
the congested line from bus 2 to bus 3.
To further motivate the TCRSI index as defined in (3.14), consider
the following alternative formulation. Instead of scaling load conformally as
in (3.14b), suppose that we had modeled each load as an independent variable
and then maximized the total demand without the supply of each given firm.
In the case of omitting the supply from generator g3, the resulting loads at
buses 0 and 1 would be d0 = 0MW and d1 = 3500MW, respectively. This
alternative modeling distorts the original geographical pattern of demand and
would give the false impression that g3 were not pivotal. In this example,
generator g3 is in fact pivotal due to its particular situation with respect to
transmission constraints. The TCRSI reveals that g3 has great potential for
exercising market power since it can offer its production at arbitrarily high
prices and consequently drive up the market-clearing prices.
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Table 3.4: TCRSI and RSI of the IEEE 118-bus Reliability Test system
Firm TCRSI RSI Capacity Share1
A 0.61 3.30 0.09
B 1.00 3.10 0.14
C 0.85 2.83 0.22
D 1.48 3.17 0.13
E 1.23 3.06 0.15
F 1.39 2.76 0.24
1 defined as
firm’s total capacity
total capacity in the system
.
3.5.2 IEEE 118-bus Reliability Test System
We evaluated the TCRSI for the IEEE 118-bus Reliability Test System
with the same data set used in Section 3.3.3. Table 3.4 shows the TCRSI, the
RSI, and the capacity share of each firm. We assume the available supply of
each generator is equal to its capacity. Ignoring transmission constraints, the
system has an abundance of capacity to satisfy demand since the RSI of all
firms are higher than 2.5. According to the RSI, there are no pivotal firms in
the system. However, the TCRSI indicates that firms A and C are actually
pivotal considering transmission constraints. Interestingly, firm A, which has
the smallest TCRSI value, also has the largest RSI value and the least capacity
share. This example again demonstrates that RSI analysis is insufficient to
indicate the pivotal firms in the context of transmission constraints. Note




We evaluated the TCRSI for the ERCOT system with the same data
set used in Section 3.3.4 and assuming that the capacity of each generator rep-
resents its available supply. In addition to all the pre-contingency transmission
constraints, the binding and near binding post-contingency constraints from
the SCOPF results are also incorporated into the analysis.6 Table 3.5 lists the
six firms with the largest capacity share. The RSI analysis indicates that only
one firm is pivotal, while the TCRSI reveals that four market participants are
pivotal firms due to the effect of transmission constraints. Note that firms
B and D have a relatively small capacity share, compared to firms A and C.
However, the location of generators owned by firms B and D causes them to
be pivotal suppliers.
Figure 3.4(b) in page 76 shows the contour map of the TCRSI for the
ERCOT system. In both Figures 3.4(a) and 3.4(b), the generators owned by
firm A are shown in red contours: firm A has the smallest TCRSI and also
the largest estimated mark-up among all the firms. We can also observe that
among the six selected firms, the firms with larger index according to (3.5)
also have lower TCRSI. However, this observation is not always true for other
firms in the system, which will be further discussed in Section 3.6.
6That is, we potentially omit some actually binding post-contingency constraints for
some firms. This means that the values we obtain may over-estimate the actual TCRSI.
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Table 3.5: TCRSI and RSI for selected firms in the ERCOT System
Firm TCRSI RSI Capacity Share
A 0.668 0.976 0.199
B 0.793 1.151 0.056
C 0.809 1.077 0.116
D 0.859 1.158 0.050
E 1.003 1.184 0.028
F 1.004 1.184 0.029
3.6 Comparison of Indices
Two different categories of firm-based transmission-constrained market
power assessment tools have been proposed in this chapter. The TCMPI
involves ex post analysis, that is, it depends on offer information and the OPF
results. Based on this information, the index estimates the quantity-weighted
average mark-up above competitive levels for a given firm. A firm should be
flagged as of potential concern if its index value is high.
In contrast, the TCRSI is an ex ante analysis, which does not require
generation offers nor the OPF results, and estimates the extent to which a
firm’s supply is necessary to meet the demand under transmission constraints.
Note that the TCRSI does not depend on the behavior of the market partici-
pants and is aimed at predicting the potential for market power beforehand.
As a further distinction between these approaches, note that the transmission-
constrained market power index is a “small signal” analysis; that is, it is based
on the derivative of market-clearing price with respect to demand. On the
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other hand, the TCRSI is a “large signal” analysis, since all the available
supply from a firm is withdrawn during the analysis.
Although these two market power analysis schemes are different from
several perspectives, they have one common characteristic: they both focus
on what a firm could do, given the behavior and characteristics of the others.
The two different approaches have different applications in evaluating market
power. The TCMPI is suitable for detecting the exercise of market power,
since it is based on the hypothesis that a firm is maximizing its profit. In
other words, if a firm is maximizing its profit and significantly raising the
prices above competitive levels, the index would reflect this behavior.
On the other hand, the TCRSI is an appropriate tool for predicting
the possession of market power. It does not require generation offers and
market clearing results but could identify the firms that have absolute market
power. Therefore, both tools can be integrated into the market power analysis
flow due to their different implications for market power. Figure 3.6 shows
a scatter plot of the TCRSI versus the TCMPI (on a common log scale) for
the ERCOT system. From the figure, we can observe that the TCRSI and
TCMPI are complementary in some cases: some firms are pivotal but their
estimated mark-ups are just moderately large, while some firms have very
large estimated mark-ups even without being pivotal. The numerical results
are consistent with our claim that these two approaches are complementary in
assessment of market power and can both be utilized to analyze the behavior
of the firms.
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Figure 3.6: TCRSI versus TCMPI for the ERCOT system. This figure shows that
TCRSI and TCMPI are complementary in some cases: some firms are pivotal but
their estimated mark-ups are just moderately large, while some firms have very
large estimated mark-ups even without being pivotal. This results suggest that
these two approaches are complementary in assessment of market power and can
both be utilized to analyze the behavior of the firms.
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3.7 Conclusion
Market power continues to be a problematic issue that causes electric-
ity markets inefficient. Unfortunately, most existing approaches of analyzing
market power in transmission-constrained markets only have tenuous connec-
tions to economic incentives of exercising market power. In this chapter, we
propose two different approaches to firm-based market power analysis: the
transmission-constrained market power index (TCMPI), and the transmission-
constrained residual supply index (TCRSI). We not only show the rationale
of these approaches but also develop computationally efficient implementa-
tions for them, which can cope with large-scale systems such as the ERCOT
system. Numerical results show that the TCMPI can indeed provide reliable
estimates on price mark-ups above competitive levels and thus help the market
monitor restore the prices to appropriate levels. On the other hand, we also
demonstrate that the TCRSI provides more useful insights on market power
in transmission-constrained markets, compared to the RSI. The two proposed
indices are compared with qualitative analysis together with experimental re-
sults; we conclude that both methods should be incorporated into market
power analysis flow, because their different insights about market power can







Electric power grid operations need reserves to balance supply and de-
mand under system contingencies, and appropriate reserve allocation is thus
essential for efficient system and market operations. In Section 1.3, we sum-
marize the three issues regarding reserves that should be addressed carefully,
they are,
• variability of wind,
• geographical allocation of reserves, and
• sufficient primary frequency control.
Failing to incorporate these issues in reserve allocation may lead to unreli-
able, inefficient system operations. Even without significant levels of wind
power integration, system operators have growing concerns about geograph-
ical allocation of reserves [29] [74] and primary frequency control [36] [45].
This chapter proposes a new model, the stochastic economic dispatch model
(SED), to find the optimal schedules for energy and reserves that result in the
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minimum expected operation costs. The three issues regarding reserves are
systematically addressed in the proposed model.
Stochastic programming (or stochastic optimization) is a promising ap-
proach to dispatch generation and allocate reserves under uncertainty. Takriti
and Birge [65] describe a multi-stage stochastic program to solve a unit com-
mitment problem with uncertain demand, but without transmission constraints.
Bouffard et al. [11] propose a stochastic market-clearing model considering
transmission constraints. Their model deals with equipment failures and uses
the expected value of unserved energy as the security metric. Ruiz et al. [56]
propose a two-stage stochastic unit commitment model that incorporates re-
serve requirements. Kimball et al. [35] propose a stochastic optimal power
flow model and solve it by Benders’ decomposition. They demonstrate that
a stochastic model can indeed reduce the expected operation costs. Saric et
al. [58] formulate the single period market clearing process using a two-stage
stochastic program and show that the model is computationally tractable us-
ing an interior-point algorithm together with Benders’ decomposition. Note
that none of the models reported in these references represent the response of
system frequency. In other words, these model use the “steady-state” equilib-
rium to represent the post-contingency operation. However, according to [36],
the quality of frequency control in U.S. has been declining in recent years
and thus primary frequency control should be incorporated in the operation
planning process. This observation motivates us to propose a new model that
characterize post-contingency frequency dynamics in order to ensure sufficient
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primary frequency control.
Several papers in the literature attempt to incorporate frequency re-
sponse into the dispatch problem. Somuah and Schweppe [62] develop an eco-
nomic dispatch model with a constraint on the maximum frequency deviation
given a specified disturbance. The frequency constraint incorporates turbine
dynamics, which makes the problem non-convex.1 Restrepo and Galiana [55]
develop a unit commitment model with requirements for primary frequency
control. They characterize the amount of primary frequency control a unit
could provide using the steady-state frequency deviation, without considera-
tion of under-frequency load shedding (UFLS). Doherty et al. [18] develop a
market-clearing model with linear frequency control constraints. They simu-
lated a large number of events using a simplified dynamic model to construct
a feasible region in terms of system kinetic energy, reserve procurement, and
size of contingency. Ruiz and Sauer [57] describe a simplified dynamic model
to estimate the amount of UFLS and construct a demand curve for reserves.
The models in both [18] and [57] aggregate the primary frequency control of
each unit into a single quantity. That is, each unit’s impact on the system
frequency, depending on its response speed and operating point, is not well
differentiated.
1Although the authors of [62] claim the frequency deviation function is convex, no rigor-
ous proof is provided. In fact, the co-existence of the fifth and sixth term in equation (13)
in [62] makes the function non-convex.
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This chapter proposes a new model, the stochastic economic dispatch
model (SED), to find the optimal schedules for energy and reserves that min-
imize expected operation costs (including penalties for load shedding). Our
main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose the idea of incorporating minimum frequency constraints in
a stochastic optimization framework, so that primary frequency control
and geographical allocation of reserves can be co-optimized to minimize
the expected operation costs.
• We propose a new formulation for frequency constraints and a method
for estimating the unserved demand resulting from UFLS. To improve
the accuracy of the frequency constraints, we characterize each individ-
ual generator’s impact on the system frequency based on its maximum
ramp rate and “headroom,” i.e., available capacity left for increasing out-
put. Moreover, the proposed formulation is convex and computationally
efficient. Comparison with transient simulation is also provided to show
the accuracy of our formulation.
• We apply the L-shaped decomposition method [61] for solution and pro-
vide numerical results based on medium- and large-scale systems. Com-
putational efficiency of the formulation is demonstrated. We also show
that the proposed model improves the dispatch in terms of expected
operation costs, compared to deterministic methods.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 introduces
the formulation of SED. Section 4.4 presents the decomposition algorithm.
Section 4.5 provides numerical examples, and Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Stochastic Economic Dispatch Model
4.2.1 Introduction
The proposed model, the stochastic economic dispatch model (SED), is
formulated as a two-stage stochastic convex program. The first-stage decisions
represent pre-contingency generation dispatch and procurements of reserves.
After knowing a specific realization of system conditions, second-stage deci-
sions, the generation re-dispatch decisions, are made to optimally respond to
this specific scenario. Note that the feasible region of second-stage decisions
are influenced by the first-stage decisions. For example, if more reserves are
procured in the first-stage, the more generation resources would be available in
the second-stage. The objective of SED is to minimize the expected operation
costs, subject to both pre- and post-contingency operation constraints over an
operational time frame.
In SED, a contingency scenario consists of one or more generator fail-
ures, together with significant demand forecast or wind forecast errors. Note
that in the second-stage, all unknown information in the first-stage is revealed.
That is, the availability of each generator and the exact value of demand and
wind power output are known. We assume that any generation outages occur
at the beginning of the operational time frame. The operational time frame is
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Figure 4.1: Timeline of post-contingency operation represented by the second-
stage problem. In the frequency stabilizing period, system frequency is stabilized
by primary frequency responses of generators together with UFLS. In the re-dispatch
period, the system operator re-dispatches generation to restore the system security.
divided into two non-overlapping periods, as shown in Figure 4.1. These peri-
ods characterize the typical process of restoring the system back to a normal
state after the disturbance:
• Frequency stabilizing period (FSP): Over a duration of tS seconds,
system frequency is stabilized by primary frequency responses of gen-
erators together with UFLS, if necessary. Transmission constraints are
ignored in this period since the main operational goal here is to stabilize
frequency; also, a short period of violation of transmission constraints
usually does not threat system reliability. The FSP is analogous to the
“emergency state” in [19], where the control objective is to relieve system
distress and prevent further degradation.
• Re-dispatch period (RDP): After the FSP, the system operator re-
dispatches generation to restore the system security. Involuntary load
99
shedding is applied if generators alone are insufficient to restore system
security. We suppose that spinning reserve and fast-start reserves are
ready to be deployed in this period.2 At the end of the RDP, non-
spinning reserves can be brought on-line to meet the minimum spinning
reserve requirement. The typical duration of the RDP is from 15 to 30
minutes [48]. This period is analogous to the “restorative state” in [19],
where the control objective is the safe transition from partial to full
satisfaction of all security constraints.
Unlike other stochastic dispatch models in the literature [35] [58], which use the
post-contingency “steady-state” equilibrium to characterize the post-contingency
operation, SED represents the process of disturbance recovery by incorporat-
ing frequency dynamics after the disturbance. Figure 4.1 shows the timeline
for the post-contingency operation described above. It illustrates the timing
of enforcing different operational constraints and the availability of each type
of reserve.
4.2.2 Notation
This section summarizes the notation used in the development of the
model. To simplify the presentation of the model but without loss of gener-
ality, we assume that each bus has exactly one generator and one load. Also,
wind power is modeled as negative load in our formulation and “net load” is
2Spinning reserves are usually available prior to the beginning of the RDP.
100
defined as load minus wind power output.3
Indices and Sets:
i ∈ N buses
i ∈ NW subset of buses with wind power generation
i ∈ NG subset of buses with generators equipped with governers
` ∈ L transmission constraints
ω ∈ Ω contingency scenarios
Random parameters:
d̃iω net load at bus i at the end of the RDP under scenarios ω [MW]
ãiω availability of generator at bus i under scenarios ω: 1 for normal operation,
0 for outage
Parameters:
πω probability of contingency scenario ω
π0 probability that no contingencies occur
3The wind generation resources could also be modeled as non-dispatchable generators
with equivalent inertia.
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tS length of frequency stabilizing period [s]
tL duration of involuntary load shedding until restored [h]
di net load forecast at bus i [MW]
b` limit of transmission constraint ` [MW]
A`i shift factors of injection at bus i on constraint `
ui commitment status of generator at bus i: 1 is on-line, 0 is not
αi for generator at bus i: 1 is fast start capable, 0 is not
Hi inertia constant
4 for generator at bus i [s]
gi maximum output of generator at bus i [MW]
g
i
minimum output of generator at bus i [MW]
gSPi spinning reserve limit of generator at bus i [MW]
ρi upper ramp rate limit of generator at bus i [MW/s]
c penalty cost for unserved load [$/MWh]
s post-contingency spinning reserves requirement [MW]
vi fraction of UFLS deployed at bus i
4H =




xi generation dispatch of generator at bus i [MW]
rSPi spinning reserve from generator at bus i [MW]
rFSi fast-start reserve from generator at bus i [MW]
rNSi non-spinning reserve from generator at bus i [MW]
Second-stage decision variables:
xRiω generation re-dispatch at bus i during the RDP under scenario ω [MW]
lSω load shedding triggered in the FSP under scenario ω [MW]
lRiω load shedding triggered in the RDP at bus i under scenario ω [MW]
yiω restored spinning reserve from generator at bus i under scenario ω [MW]
Functions:
Ce energy cost incurred in operational time frame [$]
Cr reserve cost incurred in operational time frame [$]
Qω second-stage post-contingency cost in operational time frame [$] (see Sec-
tion 4.2.3 and Section 4.3.2)
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4.2.3 Stochastic economic dispatch model
Let x ∈ R|N| be the vector collecting together the dispatch variables xi,
i ∈ N. Similarly, r ∈ R3|N| is the collection of all reserves variables, rSPi , rFSi ,
and rNSi , i ∈ N. Function Qω, the post-contingency cost, will be introduced in
Sections 4.2.4 and 4.3. SED is formulated as:
min
x,r
π0 (Ce(x) + Cr(r)) +
∑
ω∈Ω




(xi − di) = 0 (4.1b)
∑
i∈N
A`i(xi − di) ≤ b`, ∀` ∈ L (4.1c)
xi + r
SP
i ≤ uigi, ∀i ∈ N (4.1d)
xi ≥ uigi, ∀i ∈ N (4.1e)
rSPi ≤ uigSPi , ∀i ∈ N (4.1f)
rFSi ≤ (1− ui)(αi)gi, ∀i ∈ N (4.1g)
rFSi + r
NS
i ≤ (1− ui)gi, ∀i ∈ N, (4.1h)
The objective of SED (4.1a) is to minimize the expected operation costs. The
pre-contingency operation costs consist of energy production costs and reserve
procurement costs, weighted by π0, the probability of no occurrence of con-
tingency. The post-contingency costs Qω, the key innovation of SED, includes
the penalty costs for unserved load and re-dispatch energy costs. We assume
that function Ce is convex quadratic and that Cr is linear.
5 Constraint (4.1b)
5Typical generation costs can be well approximated by convex quadratic functions [71,
§2], while reserve costs are modeled as linear functions in most electricity markets [21,
§4.4.7] [40, §4.2].
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is the power balance constraint that ensures supply meets demand. Con-
straints (4.1c) are transmission constraints that limit the flow on each trans-
mission line, where A`i represents the amount of power flowing on line ` given
a unit injection at bus i and withdrawal at the reference bus. We use DC
power flow here, where A`i can be derived from linearization about the real-
time operating point [71]. Note that N − 1 transmission security constraints
are imposed to ensure that there will be no line-flow violations if any single
line is removed from the system. Constraints (4.1d) and (4.1e) place lower
and upper limits, respectively, on power generation for each generator. Con-
straints (4.1f) are maximum procurable spinning reserve constraints, which
are typically determined by the ramp rate limit. Constraints (4.1g) specify
that only fast-start capable generators can provide fast-start reserves, while
constraints (4.1h) indicate that off-line capacity can provide either fast-start
or non-spinning reserve, but not both. Note that the primary frequency con-
trol at bus i is implicitly determined by the generation dispatch xi, which
decides the amount of available capacity left for increasing output in the con-
tingency state. We do not model regulation reserves here, but they can also
be incorporated.
4.2.4 The second-stage problem
The second-stage problem models post-contingency system operations.
The amount of unserved demand due to UFLS in the FSP is estimated and pe-
nalized. Directly after the FSP, the system operator re-dispatches generation
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in order to restore system security. The objective in the RDP is to minimize
the generation costs and the penalty costs of involuntary load shedding. In
practice, the system operator might run a sequence of transmission-constrained
economic dispatches as load varies with time in the RDP. Because of compu-
tational limitation, only a single re-dispatch is modeled here, which is based
on the assumed known net load realization at the end of the the RDP. Let
xRω ∈ Rn be the vector collecting the dispatch variables xi. Function p̂Sω(x),
which is developed in Section 4.3, represents the amount of unserved load





































≤ b`, ∀` ∈ L (4.2d)
yiω ≤ ãiω (xi + rSPi + rFSi + rNSi − xRiω) , ∀i ∈ N (4.2e)
yiω ≤ gSPi , ∀i ∈ N (4.2f)
∑
i∈N
yiω ≥ s (4.2g)
ãiωgi ≤ x
R
iω ≤ ãiω(xi + rSPi + rFSi ), ∀i ∈ N (4.2h)
d̃iω ≥ lRiω ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {N \NW}, (4.2i)
Note that we ignore the start-up and min-load costs of deploying fast-start
and non-spinning reserves. The parameter c represents the penalty cost of
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involuntary load shedding. Constraint (4.2b) places a lower limit on the un-
served load due to UFLS. After the FSP, the transmission constraints (4.2d)
are enforced to prevent over-loaded lines and restore transmission security.
Note that the portion of load that is disconnected in the FSP are consid-
ered in constraints (4.2c) and (4.2d). Constraints (4.2e)-(4.2g) ensure that
spinning reserve is restored to the minimum level to meet the reliability stan-
dard [48, §R6], assuming that non-spinning reserves are on-line at the end of
the RDP. Constraints (4.2h) enforce upper limits on power generation for each
generator in the RDP, assuming that only spinning and fast-start reserves can
provide energy during the RDP. Note that we assume that non-spinning re-
serves are only deployable at the end of the RDP for restoring reserves. That
is, they cannot provide energy during the RDP.6 Constraints (4.2i) limit load
shedding at each bus to the total load at that bus.
The key innovation of SED is to formulate p̂Sω(x) as a convex function.
According to proposition 2.1 and 2.3 in [22], Qω is a convex function in (x, r) if
p̂Sω(x) is a convex function. The convexity of Qω further ensures SED a convex
optimization problem.
4.3 Estimating Unserved Load Due to UFLS
This section describes a method to estimate the amount of UFLS that
must be applied, given minimum frequency requirements, and incorporates
6We therefore ignore the minimum production limits of non-spinning reserves.
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that estimate into the second-stage problem (4.2). The estimated involun-
tary load shedding p̂Sω(x) is formulated as a convex function of the generation
dispatch vector x. Note that convexity is a crucial property for applying de-
composition methods and ensuring global optimality. We also provide analyt-
ical expressions for evaluating the subgradients of p̂Sω(x), in order to efficiently
generate linear approximations for the decomposition algorithm.
Directly after a disturbance, the frequency of the system declines and
generators with governors respond by increasing mechanical power output in
order to stabilize system frequency. If primary frequency responses from gener-
ators alone cannot maintain the frequency above a threshold, under-frequency
load shedding (UFLS) will be triggered to protect the system from further
damage. We assume that following a disturbance, all generators with head-
room ramp their mechanical power production at the maximum ramp rate
limits. This is a standard assumption in simplified frequency dynamic mod-
els [57] [62].
4.3.1 Evaluating system frequency
We can estimate system frequency at an instant in time by evaluating
the stored kinetic energy after the disturbance. Recall that the stored kinetic






where I is the system inertia and f is the system frequency in Hz. Since f is








Because f is a monotonic function in E, enforcing the minimum frequency
requirement would be equivalent to enforcing a lower bound on stored kinetic
energy. Assuming that the system is at the nominal frequency before the
disturbance and no UFLS is applied, we obtain the frequency constraints
Eω +∆eω(x, t) ≥ Eω, t ∈ [0, tS], (4.4)
where:












Eω, the system kinetic energy at the low frequency limit
fmin.
The quantity ∆eω(x, t) can be estimated by the energy imbalance between
load and generation up to time t due to the disturbances. Under a contin-
gency scenario ω, let Oω = {i|ãiω = 0} be the set of buses with generation
7We assume that the machine MVA rating is equal to the maximum power output g
i
. We
can also use estimates of system inertia constant using historical data [30], which includes
inertia of load.
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outage and let Aω = N
G\Oω be the set of buses with available generators
(in normal operation) having governors. Suppose that disturbance occurs at
t = 0. According to our assumption on ramping of available generators, the




ρit, if t < ti
gi − xi, if t ≥ ti
, (4.5)





is the time when generator i reaches its maximum output limit gi. For the
convenience of analysis, we assume that total generation mechanical output
will never exceed the load.8 Now, assume that total load is constant during
the FSP and that pre-contingency dispatch x satisfies power balance constraint
(4.1b). The increased mechanical power output from all available generators











∆piω(xi, t), if t ≤ t∗
∑
i∈Oω
xi, if t > t
∗
, (4.7)
where t∗ is either
• the time when mechanical power output matches the load, if this occurs
within the the duration of the FSP tS, or,
8Although, in practice, generation mechanical output will exceed the load to restore
frequency after the frequency nadir, this assumption has no impact on the estimation of
amount of unserved energy in the adopted UFLS model.
110




















Given the mechanical power output function ∆pω, t
∗ can be easily computed.
Note that without any UFLS, the system frequency reaches its nadir at t∗.
The change in stored kinetic energy at time t is the integral of power











Let Bω(t) ⊆ Aω be the set of generators having binding capacity constraints
before t, that is,
Bω(t) = {i|ti ≤ t, i ∈ Aω} ,
and let Bcω(t) = Aω\Bω(t) be the complement set of Bω(t). Combine (4.5)
















































Note that ∆eω is negative and non-increasing in t. Also, it reaches the mini-
mum ∆e∗ω at time t
∗, that is,
∆e∗ω(x) = ∆eω(x, t
∗). (4.11)
Therefore, enforcing minimum frequency constraints at time t∗ ensures that
(4.4) is satisfied, that is,
Eω +∆e
∗
ω(x) ≥ Eω. (4.12)
4.3.2 Estimating the amount of UFLS
In the case that governor responses alone cannot suffice to satisfy the
frequency constraint (4.12), UFLS needs to be deployed to maintain system
frequency above the threshold fmin. One approach to approximate the amount
of UFLS [57] uses the shortfall in stored kinetic energy to meet the frequency
threshold, that is,
eSω(x) = max {Eω − (Eω +∆e∗ω (x)) , 0} . (4.13)
Under this scheme, load shedding ends immediately when the mechanical
power output meets the load. However, the load shed will remain discon-
nected from several minutes to several hours in practice. Therefore, we must
estimate the amount of power shed that maintains the system frequency above
the limit, and model the duration of the power shed.
In practice, there may be multiple frequency thresholds triggering dif-
ferent sets of under-frequency relays. There are also types of UFLS that are
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triggered when the frequency remains below a certain threshold for a specified
time interval, or triggered when the rate of change in frequency is sufficiently
large. We therefore define the “theoretically optimal UFLS,” pSω(x), to ap-
proximate the actual UFLS. Note that we assume a single frequency threshold
fmin. This is a widely used assumption for estimating under-frequency load
shedding [57]. We assume that UFLS is triggered at t̂, the time when the
system frequency reaches the low frequency limit. That is,
t̂ = min
t
{t|Eω +∆eω(x, t) = Eω} . (4.14)
The theoretically optimal UFLS is defined as the power imbalance between




xi −∆pω(x, t̂). (4.15)
pSω(x) represents the minimum amount of load shedding needed to ensure the
frequency above the low frequency limit. Although pSω can be computed effi-
ciently given a dispatch x, the function pSω(x) is non-convex. However, from
numerical experiments, we find that the mapping between pSω and e
S
ω is almost
linear for scenarios having similar sizes of disturbance. Since eSω(x) is convex
(shown in Proposition 1 below), we use eSω to approximate p
S
ω and ensure a
convex approximation of the problem, that is,
p̂Sω(x) = γωe
S
ω(x) + σω, (4.16)
9Although we may achieve a lower amount of UFLS by disconnecting load earlier than t̂,
the theoretically optimal UFLS emulates the practice that a under-frequency relay is usually
triggered with a certain frequency threshold.
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where p̂Sω is the approximated power shed. Non-negative coefficients γω and σω
can be either obtained by ex ante simulation, or evaluated during the process
of solving SED, as will be discussed in Section 4.4.
We use a single generator model to explain why (4.16) forms a reason-
able approximation to pSω(x). Assume that this generator has a pre-contingency
dispatch x̄, a maximum output limit ḡ, and a maximum ramp rate ρ̄. Let the
size of disturbance be Lω, where Lω =
∑
i∈Oω
xi. We assume the generator’s




< tS; therefore, t∗ =
Lω
ρ̄
. We also suppose that UFLS is triggered.










Substituting (4.18) into (4.13) gives:




Moreover, according to (4.15), pSω is the power imbalance at time t̂:
pSω = Lω − ρ̄t̂. (4.20)




− Lω t̂) = Eω.
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By solving the above equation, we obtain:10
t̂ ≈ Lω −
√
L2ω − 2ρ̄(Eω −Eω)
ρ̄
. (4.21)
Substituting (4.19) into the above equation gives:









For a given scenario ω, if the associated kinetic energy shortfall eSω(x) concen-
trates in a particular range, then (4.23) can be well-approximated by the linear
function (4.16). Figure 4.4 in Section 4.5.2 provides a numerical example to
support this observation.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the constructed UFLS model. The solid curve
represents the mechanical power output of the generators, which is piecewise-
linear. The breakpoint represents when a generation capacity constraint be-
comes binding. The frequency reaches the lower limit at t̂, while the decrement
in kinetic energy, represented by the area of solid shaded region, reaches the
upper limit Eω−Eω. The power imbalance at t̂ is the assumed power shed pSω.
In addition, the area with slanted lines represents eSω, the kinetic energy short-
fall to meet the frequency requirement fmin without applying UFLS, which is
used to approximate the amount of power shed pSω.
10t̂ is the smaller root since UFLS is triggered once the frequency reaches the low limit.
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of constructed UFLS model. The solid curve represents
the mechanical power output of the generators, which is piece-wise linear. The
breakpoint represents when a generation capacity constraint becomes binding. The
frequency reaches the lower limit at t̂, while the decrement in kinetic energy, rep-
resented by the area of solid shaded region, reaches the upper limit Eω − Eω. The
power imbalance at t̂ is the theoretically optimal UFLS pSω.
116
Proposition 1. p̂Sω(x) is a convex function in x.
Proof. In (4.5), since ρit is non-decreasing, ∆piω(xi, t) can be expressed as a
pointwise minimum function:
∆piω(xi, t) = min{ρit, gi − xi}.
This function is concave in xi. Therefore,
∑
i∈Aω
∆piω(xi, t) is also concave in x.
By the same reasoning of pointwise minimum, ∆pω(x, t) is also concave in x.




xi, t > t
∗.











Since for any t ∈ [0, tS], ∆pω(x, t) is a concave function in x, the integral over
t of ∆pω(x, t) is also concave. The maximum operator in (4.13) implies that




Some governors do not respond to decline in system frequency imme-
diately, but with some response delay. This initial response delay can be
incorporated in our model. Given the initial delay tdi for governor of generator









0, if t < tdi
ρi(t− tdi ), if tdi ≤ t < ti














Thus ∆piω(xi, t) is still a concave function in xi and the convexity of e
S
ω(x)
is preserved. Assume that t∗ > tdi for i ∈ Aω. With a similar derivation to























As we discuss in Section 4.4, the L-shaped method (algorithm) is ap-
plied to solve SED. The method requires repeated evaluation of the subgradient
of p̂Sω(x). Appendix A develop an analytical expression for that subgradient
based on one particular directional derivative. This analytical expression can
significantly improve computational efficiency.
4.4 Decomposition Algorithm
Slyke and Wets [61] develop the L-shaped method to exploit the special
structure of a stochastic linear program (See also Benders [7]). Birge and
Tang generalize this method to the case of stochastic convex program [8].
Since p̂Sω(x) is convex, the optimal value of the second-stage problem Qω is a
convex functions of (x, r) [22]. Therefore, the L-shaped method can be applied
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to solve SED. The main idea of the L-shaped method is to represent sub-
problems Qω with their outer linearizations in (4.1), so that Qω can be solved
independently for each scenario. The decomposition algorithm is described
below as Algorithm 2.11
At the beginning of the algorithm, we need to set the coefficients γω and
σω in (4.16) to some initial values. A reasonable initial value for γω is between
0 to 1, where the unit is sec−1, since the value of pSω is usually smaller than the
value of eSω according to numerical experiments. A good initial guess for σω
is 0, because there would be no load-shedding with eSω of 0. During the first
several iterations, in addition to evaluating eSω, we compute p
S
ω using (4.15) to
obtain γω and σω by linear regression. From numerical experiments, we observe
that the correlation between eSω and p
S
ω tends to be strong under similar sizes
of contingency (see Figure 4.4); thus a moderate number of samples of eSω
and pSω is likely to provide reasonable estimates of γω and σω. Note that we
only update γω and σω once in the algorithm. Therefore, after the update,
the algorithm becomes a standard decomposition algorithm for a non-linear
program, for which the convergence is guaranteed [25] [32].
In the L-shaped method, optimality cuts (4.26b) should form lower
bounds of Qω. However, updating the coefficients for scenario ω changes the
function Qω. As a result, existing optimality cuts associated with ω might no
11Note that we assume the second-stage problem (4.2) is feasible for every feasible first-
stage decisions. This can be easily achieved by adding a artificial variable, with a large
objective function penalty, to each constraint in (4.2g). Therefore no feasibility cuts are
needed.
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Algorithm 2 Solving SED Model
Input: Network data, optimality tolerance ε.
Output: ε-optimal (x∗, r∗) and the associated cost z∗.
m← 1, z∗ = +∞.
loop
Solve the relaxed master program:
min
x,r,θ



























+ ηkω, ∀ω ∈ Ω, k = 1, . . . , m.
(4.26b)
Let (x̂, r̂) be the optimal solution of the relaxed master program and let
z be the corresponding optimal value. For all ω ∈ Ω, compute eSω(x) and
p̂Sω(x) using (4.13) and (4.16), respectively. Form the right-hand sides of
(4.2) and solve Qω(x̂, r̂). Then compute the associated cost ẑ using (4.1a).
if ẑ ≤ z∗ then
z∗ ← ẑ
(x∗, r∗)← (x̂, r̂)
end if
if z∗ − z ≤ εmin(z∗, z) then
Stop: (x∗, r∗) is the ε-optimal solution.
end if
For each ω ∈ Ω, compute βiω(x̂) using equation (A.6) in Appendix A.
Augment the set of optimality cuts in (4.26b) with cut coefficients:
βmiω = βiω(x̂), ψ
m
ω = ψ̂ω, λ
m
iω = λ̂iω, µ
m
iω = µ̂iω,
where ψ̂ω, λ̂iω, and µ̂iω are the optimal dual variables of constraints (4.2b),




























longer be lower bounds of Qω and thus should be removed. However, under
certain conditions, as described in Appendix B, the existing optimality cuts can
be preserved. Some computational effort can be saved by keeping the existing
cuts since they still provide useful information of the updated second-stage
problem. In the context of solving successive SEDs for consecutive dispatch
intervals, the updated coefficients can serve as good initial values for solving
the SED for the subsequent dispatch interval. To simplify the presentation of
the L-shaped method, we do not include this procedure of updating γω and
σω in Algorithm 2.
Since the cost of involuntary load shedding is dominant in (4.2a) [29],
we may ignore the difference in pre- and post-contingency energy-production
costs. That is, the approximated objective function of the re-dispatch model
(4.2) is ctL(lSω +
∑
i∈N
lRiω), and the second-stage energy costs are aggregated
with the first-stage energy costs. This approximation simplifies the second-
stage problems (4.2) from quadratic programs into linear programs, which
significantly reduces the computational burden for large problems.
4.5 Numerical Examples
4.5.1 Validation of simplified frequency model
To validate the simplified frequency model developed in Section 4.3, we
perform a case study by comparing our model with the transient simulation
results produced by PowerWorld. A nine-bus system with four generators is
used. Given a dispatch x, the change in stored kinetic energy is computed
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Table 4.1: Comparison of simulated and estimated frequency nadirs under
different sizes of disturbances (frequency units are Hz.)
x1 (MW) PowerWorld Estimation error (%)
30 59.206 59.200 0.01
35 58.894 58.917 0.04
40 58.538 58.567 0.05
45 58.132 58.155 0.04
50 57.674 57.679 0.01









We consider generator outage at bus 1. The pre-contingency dispatch is
x2 = 140MW, x3 = 100MW, x4 = 60MW. Different values of pre-contingency
dispatch x1, for generator at bus 1, are used to simulate the effect of various
magnitudes of disturbances. Suppose that gi = 150MW, Hi = 5s, t
d
i = 0.2s,
and ρi = 168MW/min, ∀i ∈ NG.12 Table 4.1 compares the results, which in-
dicate that the proposed frequency model does accurately estimate frequency
nadirs. The errors are all under 0.05%. For a disturbance size of 35MW,
around 12 % of the load, Figure 4.3 plots the estimated and simulated fre-
quency, indicating the proposed frequency model also accurately evaluate sys-
tem frequency in the time domain.
12We use governor model “GGOV1” in the version 15 of PowerWorld. All governor
parameters are set to default except for Ropen = 0.015, Kturb = 1.25, and Trate = 150MW.
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of estimated and simulated frequency in time domain.
This figure shows that the simplified frequency model developed in Section 4.3 does
accurately estimate the frequency, compared to transient simulation results using
PowerWorld.
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4.5.2 IEEE 118-bus Reliability Test System
Power flow data for the IEEE 118-bus Reliability Test System together
with pre-defined contingency scenarios are used here to compare SED and con-
ventional economic dispatch. Each scenario corresponds to a single generator
outage. Suppose that the system inertia constant is 6s. The outage probabili-
ties for the 46 in-service generators, estimated from the reliability data in [54],
range from 1 × 10−4 to 1.1 × 10−3 during the operational time frame of 30
minutes. Other important problem specifications are:
• The minimum frequency is set as 57.5Hz, with a nominal frequency of
60Hz.
• The total load in the system is 3668 MW, and on-line generation capacity
is 4747 MW.
• The penalty c is set as $10, 000/MWh with load-shedding duration tL of
one half hour.
We use generic generation cost data provided in [54]. This example
focuses on the benefits of modeling frequency control and geographical alloca-
tion of spinning reserves, and thus omits fast-start or non-spinning reserves.13
Besides 194 base-case transmission constraints, we add 10 binding and near-
binding N−1 transmission security constraints by solving security-constrained
13We therefore assume g
i
is 0 for any generator with ui = 0. Also, reserve restoring
constraint (4.2g) is therefore ignored.
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optimal power flow (SCOPF) in PowerWorld. We use Gurobi 4.5 as the linear
and quadratic program solver, together with the Python language to imple-
ment the decomposition.
In addition to solving SED (4.1), the economic dispatch (ED) model
with fixed reserve requirements is solved for comparison [5]. The spinning
reserve requirement of the ED model is 400 MW, which is the capacity of
the largest unit. We then evaluate the post-contingency operation cost of
the ED solution by solving the second-stage problems (4.2). Using a laptop
computer on Windows 7 with 2.0 GHz dual core CPU and 3GB RAM, the
CPU time for solving SED is 24.19 seconds. It takes 56 outer iterations to
converge to an optimality tolerance of 0.01%. Table 4.2 shows that the saving
of expected cost using the stochastic solution is 3.79%. Note that there are only
three units producing at their maximum capacity in the stochastic solution,
compared to 21 units in the deterministic solution. In other words, in the
stochastic solution, more units are available for responding to the disturbance
simultaneously and, consequently, the expected UFLS is about 45% lower,
compared to the deterministic solution. Besides better frequency response,
SED improves the geographical allocation of reserves by incorporating post-
contingency transmission constraints, which contribute to in 20% less expected
load shedding deployed in the RDP. The trade-off for better security is a 4.72%
higher pre-contingency cost for the stochastic solution.
Figure 4.4 shows the scatter plot of pSω and e
S
ω, obtained at the first
two outer iterations. We collect contingencies with similar sizes into a group,
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Figure 4.4: eSω versus p
S
ω for the IEEE 118-bus Reliability Test System. This figure
indicates that pSω is approximately linear in e
S
ω for each group of contingencies. This
finding suggests that we can reasonably approximate pSω using e
S
ω for ensuring the
convexity of SED, as described by the (4.16) in Section 4.3.
and each type of marker in the figure represents such a group. Interestingly,
the figures shows that pSω is roughly proportional to
√
eSω, which is consistent
with (4.23). This figure also indicates that pSω is approximately linear in e
S
ω
for each group of contingencies. This finding suggests that we can reasonably
approximate pSω using e
S
ω for ensuring the convexity of SED, as described by
the (4.16) in Section 4.3.
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Table 4.2: Results for the 118 bus system
SED ED
Expected cost ($/h) 57584.65 59852.86
EUFLS1 0.60 1.35
EUL in RDP2 0.73 0.91
Pre-Contingency cost ($/h) 50993.22 48695.70
Spin. Reserve Procured (MW) 449.56 400.00
1 Expected UFLS (MW) triggered in the FSP.
2 Expected load shedding (MW) deployed in the RDP.
4.5.3 ERCOT system
The ERCOT network and load data for summer 2011 together with
generic costs14 and pre-defined contingency scenarios are used to compare
SED and conventional economic dispatch. Assume the system inertia con-
stant is 4s [36]. The probability of a single generation contingency during the
operational time frame of one half hour, estimated by the generating availabil-
ity data system (GADS) provided by NERC [46], ranges from 8.8 × 10−5 to
6.8 × 10−3, depending on the type of generator. These probabilities are then
used to construct contingency scenarios, as discussed in the next paragraph.
The minimum frequency is set as 59.5 Hz15, with the nominal frequency of
60 Hz. The total load in the system is 59.60 GW, on-line generation capac-
ity (without wind capacity) is 59.68 GW, and the forecasted wind output is
4431 MW. The penalties c are set $30,000/MWh with load-shedding duration
14For instance, for a 600MW coal-fired generation unit, the marginal cost curve, repre-
sented as a linear function, ranges from $24-30/MWh. As another example, for a 400MW
gas-fired steam turbine, the marginal cost curve, also represented as a linear function, ranges
from $63-71/MWh.
15The highest frequency thresholds in North America range from 59.3 to 59.7 Hz [36].
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tL of one half hour.16 In this example, we focus on the benefits of modeling
frequency control and geographical allocation of spinning reserves and thus do
not include fast-start and non-spinning reserves. Also, besides 7186 base-case
transmission constraints, we add 10 binding and near-binding N −1 transmis-
sion security constraints, obtained from solving security-constrained optimal
power flow (SCOPF) in PowerWorld with the given power flow and generic
cost data.
We use historical wind data in the ERCOT during 2008 and 2009 to
estimate the probabilities and sizes of significant wind ramp events in the
operational time frame of an half hour. (Note that in real-time operation, we
can utilize a wind ramp forecasting tool to obtain more accurate estimates
of the likelihood of large wind events [2].) Given a sequence of wind power
output data sampled with fixed time interval {pk}, k = 1, ...n, and assume m
samples are taken in 30 minutes. Define set B = {k | p ≤ pk < p} and the
set A = {k | δ ≤ pk − pk+m < δ}. The conditional probability of a wind ramp
event is estimated as
P (δ ≤ ramp size < δ | p ≤ wind power output < p) ≈ |A||B| ,
where the size of the ramp is represented by the mean of samples in A. Ta-
ble 4.3 summarizes the derived wind ramp sizes and probabilities conditioned
on the forecasted wind output. Note that the decreased wind output is dis-
16The parameter c roughly corresponds to the reliability standard “one day in ten years”
[28].
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Table 4.3: Estimated conditional probability of significant wind ramp event
Ramp Range (MW) Avg. Ramp Size (MW) Prob.(%)




tributed to each wind farm, which is treated as a generator, proportional to
its forecasted output. There are 87 on-line wind farms in the power flow data.
Each contingency scenario consists of generation outages or a realiza-
tion of significant wind ramp, or both. We assume that wind events and gen-
eration outages are independent. The largest generation contingency is the
loss of two co-located nuclear units, totaling 2443 MW of capacity.17 To make
the number of scenarios manageable, only generation contingencies greater
than 900 MW in capacity are considered. Furthermore, scenarios with co-
occurrence of large wind ramps and generation outages are only incorporated
if the associated probabilities are greater than 10−6. There are a total of 36
contingency scenarios after applying this scenario reduction rule.
4.5.3.1 Impact of various risk of wind ramps
The probabilities of wind ramps in Table 4.3 are scaled to increased lev-
els to simulate the system under different risk of significant wind events. The
17Although the size of contingency is determined by the actual production of generators,
we use capacities to approximate the actual generation outputs. This approximation is
reasonable particularly for units with large capacity, since these units usually produce at
their maximum output limit due to their low operation costs.
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first column of Table 4.4 shows the scaled probability of the largest ramp. All
other probabilities are scaled proportionally. The ED model with a spinning
reserve requirement of 2443 MW (size of the largest generation contingency) is
solved for comparison. Table 4.4 shows that SED produces about 1.5% of cost
saving over the ED for each case. The fourth and fifth columns of Table 4.4
show that the expected UFLS is significantly reduced using the SED solution,
and suggests that the cost savings are mainly due to the improved system
frequency response. Apparently, SED procures more spinning reserve under
higher probabilities of wind ramps to reduce risk associated with involuntary
load shedding. However, in all cases, the procured amounts are lower than the
spinning reserve requirement in the ED model. Interestingly, in some cases,
a lower value of spinning reserves results in less load shedding in the RDP,
probably because of a better geographical allocation.
4.5.3.2 Impact of increased level of wind integration
We simulate the impact of expansion in installed wind capacity by
increasing the size of wind ramps by 25%: the largest wind ramp is now
2848 MW. This corresponds to the estimate reported in [3], which predicts
that, in the future, the largest wind ramp-down will exceed 2800 MW with
15, 000 MW of installed wind capacity in the ERCOT region. Again, we scale
the probabilities of wind ramps in Table 4.3 to simulate the system under
different risk of significant wind events. Two ED models are solved: one
with spinning reserve requirement of 2443 MW (size of the largest generation
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Table 4.4: Impact of various risk of wind ramps
Prob.1 Exp. Cost2 EUFLS3 EUL in RDP4 SP5
SED Saving6 SED ED SED ED
0.014 1853644.8 1.63 0.802 2.644 0.244 0.004 1634.3
0.056 1857092.4 1.46 0.790 2.646 0.008 0.018 2278.6
0.112 1857465.0 1.45 0.768 2.644 0.026 0.040 2278.6
0.168 1857355.6 1.46 0.760 2.642 0.038 0.060 2278.6
0.224 1857283.4 1.48 0.786 2.638 0.050 0.080 2278.6
0.280 1857704.4 1.46 0.788 2.636 0.062 0.100 2278.6
1 Probability (%) of the largest wind ramp.
2 Expected cost in $/h.
3 Expected UFLS (MW) triggered in the FSP.
4 Expected load shedding (MW) deployed in the RDP.
5 Spinning reserve (MW) procured by the SED solution.
6 Cost saving in % compared to ED.
contingency), and the other with reserve requirement of 2848 MW (size of the
largest wind ramp). Figure 4.5 shows that the cost savings using stochastic
approach increase with higher risk of wind events. The cost savings range
from 1.49% to 3.17%, compared to the ED model with 2443 MW of reserves.
On the other hand, the cost savings range from 1.29% to 2.08%, compared to
the ED model with 2848 MW of reserves. Interestingly, the SED produces a
much more secure dispatch under high risk of wind ramps in terms of expected
load shedding, as shown in Figure 4.6. Note that the total amount of spinning
reserves of the SED solution is close to 2848 MW when the probability of
the largest wind ramp exceeds 5 × 10−4, as shown in Figure 4.7. However,
improved frequency response together with better allocation of reserves of the
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Figure 4.5: Expected cost in the ERCOT example. This figure shows that the
cost savings using stochastic approach increase with higher risk of wind events.
This finding implies that as stochastic variability increases for supply, deterministic
solutions compare more and more unfavorably with stochastic solutions.
stochastic solutions lower the expected post-contingency operation costs. This
numerical experiment implies that the stochastic approach is more useful as
the penetration levels of wind increase. As stochastic variability increases
for supply, deterministic solutions compare more and more unfavorably with
stochastic solutions.
4.5.3.3 Computational costs
With an optimality tolerance of 0.05%, the average CPU time for solv-
ing SED is 278.8 seconds, with 27 outer iterations on average. Note that the
reported CPU time includes the time for loading network data and creating op-
timization models, which takes 132 seconds on average. In the case of solving
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Figure 4.6: Expected load shedding in the ERCOT example. This figure shows
that the SED produces a much more secure dispatch under high risk of wind ramps
in terms of expected load shedding.
the model repeatedly with different system conditions, the created optimiza-
tion models can be re-used after modification. Also, since the subproblem for
each scenario (4.2) can be solved independently, parallel computing could be
used for applying SED in real-time operation. For example, if subproblems are
distributed to five computing resources, we may be able to solve this problem
instance within one minute.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has proposed a new model, the stochastic economic dis-
patch model (SED), to address issues regarding reserve allocation in power
system operations, namely, variability of wind, deliverability of reserves, and
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Figure 4.7: Spinning reserves procured in the ERCOT example. The total amount
of spinning reserves of the SED solution is close to 2848 MW when the probability
of the largest wind ramp exceeds 5× 10−4. However, improved frequency response
together with better allocation of reserves of the stochastic solutions lower the ex-
pected post-contingency operation costs.
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adequacy levels of primary frequency control. These issues are particularly
important in the face of increasing levels of wind power penetration. SED,
formulated as a two-stage stochastic convex program, searches for the opti-
mal energy dispatch and reserve allocation considering important operational
constraints. In particular, we propose a convex function to estimate under-
frequency load shedding by incorporating frequency dynamics. The proposed
model solves efficiently through decomposition. By comparing to transient
simulation using PowerWorld, we also show that the convex formulation of
system dynamics produces reasonable estimates on the average frequency. Nu-
merical results imply that SED generates energy and reserves schedules that
significantly reduce expected operation costs, compared to the current ap-
proaches of allocating reserves in most electricity markets. The results also
suggest that the cost savings using SED becomes more significant under higher





This dissertation has developed new methods for improving the effi-
ciency of electricity markets. Specifically, we develop new approaches for mar-
ket monitoring and construct a new economic dispatch model for efficiently
allocating reserve.
Market monitoring is a critical and challenging task for keeping elec-
tricity markets well-functioning. Market monitors usually adopt a variety of
indices to assess the levels of competition. These indices typically quantify
market power, defined as a market participant’s ability to profitably shift
prices away from competitive levels. However, most currently used indices
have only weak connections to the economic incentives of exercising market
power. This is particularly the case for indices that incorporate the effects
of transmission constraints. As a result, these ad hoc indices might produce
unreliable or even misleading market monitoring results.
To overcome the shortcomings of existing indices, Chapter 2 proposes
four new market power indices based on “small-signal” analysis:
• the transmission-constrained inverse residual demand derivative,
136
• the derivative of price with respect to injection,
• the estimated price-cost mark-up, and
• the estimated wealth transfer over competitive levels.
Unlike the ad hoc indices adopted in most markets, these indices are built on
economic principles and a faithful representation of transmission constraints.
These indices are based on the assumption that each market participant owns
all its assets at the same location in a transmission network. Although this
assumption is restrictive, the theoretical and computational development of
these indices provide a basis for the general case described in Chapter 3: a
market participant owns assets at different locations. Because of the complex-
ity of strategic behavior of market participants, market monitors usually need
different approaches to analyze market power. Therefore, in addition to the
small-signal analysis, Chapter 3 also presents a “large-signal” analysis to help
market monitors interpret the market outcomes from a different perspective.
To summarize, the market power indices proposed in Chapter 3 are
• the transmission-constrained market power index (TCMPI), which esti-
mates the average price mark-ups above competitive levels for a given
firm, and,
• the transmission-constrained residual supply index (TCRSI), which as-
sesses the extent to which a firm’s supply is necessary to meet demand
under transmission constraints.
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These two indices provide different insights about market power: the TCMPI
detects the exercise of market power, and the TCRSI predicts the possession of
market power. Techniques for efficiently computing these indices are also pre-
sented. Numerical results show that the TCMPI indeed produces reasonable
estimates on price mark-ups above competitive levels. In addition, numerical
examples indicate that the TCRSI is a more accurate index in transmission-
constrained markets, compared to the RSI. From both qualitative and quan-
titative analyses, we conclude that both these indices should be incorporated
into the market power analysis, because their different insights about market
power can help market monitors better judge the competitive conditions in
the market.
Another important issue we address is the reserve allocation problem
in both system and market operations. Most approaches adopted in current
markets for allocating reserves lacks of representation of key issues such as vari-
ability of wind, deliverability of reserves, and sufficiency of primary frequency
control. Therefore, current approaches may lead to an improper allocation of
reserves that may cause unnecessary operation costs or threat power system
reliability. To enhance the allocation of reserves, we propose the stochastic eco-
nomic dispatch model (SED) in Chapter 4. Unlike other stochastic dispatch
models in the literature, which use the post-contingency “steady-state” equi-
librium to characterize the post-contingency operation, the proposed model
describes the dynamic process of disturbance recovery. Consequently, the re-
liability benefits of various types of reserves are represented more faithfully in
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the optimization model. To summarize, our main contributions are as follows:
• We propose the idea of incorporating frequency dynamics into a stochas-
tic optimization framework, so that primary frequency control and ge-
ographical allocation of reserves can be co-optimized to minimize the
expected operation cost.
• We develop a new convex formulation for estimating under-frequency
load shedding based on principles of frequency dynamics.
• We apply a decomposition algorithm to efficiently solve the proposed
model for large-scale systems.
The numerical examples based on medium- and large-scale systems show the
value of the proposed formulation. That is, SED can indeed reduce the ex-
pected operation costs, compared with the conventional economic dispatch.
Numerical results suggest that the cost savings range from 1-3%, which are
significant savings for a daily operation. In most cases, the cost savings are
mainly due to the improved reserve allocation that reduces the risks of invol-
untary load shedding. The results also suggest that the cost savings using
SED becomes more significant with higher levels of wind power penetration,
whereas the conventional economic dispatch is no longer sufficient for reliable
and economical system operations.
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5.2 Future Research
In Chapter 2 and 3, we mainly focus on the theoretical construction of
market power indices. Although several numerical experiments are provided,
the offer data of market participants are based on either marginal costs or
theoretical profit-maximizing offers. We believe that applying the new indices
on real market data would be an interesting and important research topic.
In particular, we should pay attention to those market-clearing intervals with
exceptionally high prices and then examine whether the proposed indices are
able to distinguish the high competitive prices from the exercise of market
power. Note that forward contract should be considered to properly model the
incentives of profit maximization. Also, since the indices serve as estimates
of market power, statistical analysis using historical market data might be
useful for quantifying how reliable these indices are. This analysis can help
the market monitor interpret the indices with higher confidence.
For the stochastic economic dispatch model, there are several issues that
have not been addressed in this dissertation. For example, we use a simple rule
to generate contingency scenarios, which selects scenarios based on contingency
sizes and probabilities. However, there may exist some contingencies that are
small in magnitude yet cause a significant amount of involuntary load shedding
due to unresolvable transmission congestion. On the other hand, some contin-
gencies with relatively small probabilities might cause a large amount of load
shedding and thus should be included in the optimization model. In principle,
we should choose scenarios based on their probability-weighted costs. The de-
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velopment of such a method would be an important and interesting research
topic for enhancing the efficiency of SED.
As another example, in the numerical examples, we include only a frac-
tion of transmission security constraints. To incorporate all the N − 1 trans-
mission security constraints in both pre- and post-contingency problems, it is
necessary to couple SED with a contingency analysis module that produces
transmission constraints on the fly. However, this combination may greatly in-
crease the computational effort. One possible solution is to develop constraint
pruning techniques to reduce the number of security constraints. In addition,
parallel computing can be utilized to alleviate the computational burden, since






Derivation of Subgradient of p̂Sω
We start with deriving a subgradient of ∆e∗ω, which is the key part of























Assume that sets Bω(t
∗) and Bcω(t
∗) remain unchanged under a small pertur-













































under the case that mechanical power output meets the load. Otherwise,






















Together with (4.6), equation (A.1) is reduced to:
∂∆e∗ω
∂xs































(x) for s ∈ Oω is:
∂∆e∗ω
∂xs




















Let h(x) = Eω − (Eω +∆eω(x)). Then (4.13) can be re-written as:
eSω(x) = max (h(x), 0) . (A.5)












On the other hand, if h(x) ≤ 0, eSω(x) = 0, which implies
∂eSω
∂xs
(x) = 0. With
the partial derivatives in (A.2)-(A.4) and definition of p̂Sω(x) (4.16), we have



















∗ − ts), eSω(x) > 0, i ∈ Bω(t∗),
0, eSω(x) = 0, i ∈ Bω(t∗),
0, i ∈ Bcω(t∗),
γωt
∗, eSω(x) > 0, i ∈ Oω
0, eSω(x) = 0, i ∈ Oω.
(A.6)
Note that ∆e∗ω(x) might be non-differentiable at some x, which occurs when
some generators have just binding capacity constraints at t∗. In this case, any
directional derivative can serve as a subgradient. One approach to evaluate
a particular directional derivative is applying a small change in xs and re-
computing the corresponding t∗, Bω(t
∗), andBcω(t
∗). The directional derivative
is then calculated using (A.2)-(A.4). Note that equations (A.2)-(A.4) also
provide a subgradient of p̂Sω(x) in the case of governor delay. The derivation is
similar and therefore omitted.
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Appendix B
Conditions for Preserving Optimality Cuts
For scenario ω with any first-stage decisions (x, r), let γ′ω and σ
′
ω be
initial values of γω and σω in (4.16), and let Q
′
ω(x, r) be the associated second-
stage problem. Similarly, define γ′′ω and σ
′′
ω as the updated values and let
Q′′ω(x, r) be the associated second-stage problem. If:
γ′′ω ≥ γ′ω and σ′′ω ≥ σ′ω, (B.1)
then the right-hand side of (4.2b) of Q′′ω(x, r) is greater than or equal to that of
Q′ω(x, r). This implies Q
′′
ω(x, r) has a smaller feasible region and larger optimal
value, that is,
Q′′ω(x, r) ≥ Q′ω(x, r).
Therefore, the existing optimality cuts, which are lower bounds of Q′ω(•),
are still valid lower bounds of the updated second-stage problem Q′′ω(•) and
therefore can be preserved. The condition (B.1) also suggests that we can start
with relatively smaller initial values, in order to avoid removing the optimality
cuts after updating the coefficients.
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